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Articles
POLICE POWER, TAKINGS, AND DUE PROCESS
WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK*
I. THE PROBLEM
The "police" or "regulatory power of government" is its power to direct
the activities of persons within its jurisdiction. The government usually
exercises this power negatively1 but this is not always the case.2 The ex-
pansion of the government's role in an increasingly complex society oc-
curs largely through greater use of the police power. Thus, the police
power is a huge "growth industry" in America today. No wonder then
that legal and other writers, observers of fashion in their spheres as much
as Christian Dior is in his, are busy fitting together writings on this or
that aspect of the police power.
Our particular interest is in those exercises of the police power that
regulate the use of land-everything from abatement to zoning. With the
heightened attention given urban planning and environmental matters,
land-use regulations account for much if not most of the growth in the
use of the police power. Whether viewed from the perspective of the plan-
ner, the sociologist, the historian-or the lawyer-the filling up of
America's urban areas ia a phenomenon of enormous import. Although
the present article deals with legal theory, any application it receives will
be in the area of land-use regulation.
A well known definition of police power says that it "aims directly to
secure and promote the public welfare."'8 This implies a limitation on all
governmental powers, including the police power, that government shall
only perform acts that advance the public interest to some degree.4 The
* Professor of Law, University of Washington. B.A., 1951, Wichita State University;
M.A., 1953, Indiana University; J.D., 1959, University of Washington; S.J.D., 1973, Harvard
University.
' An example of the government exercising the police power negatively is the maximum
speed limit for motor vehicles.
2 The government exercises the police power positively when it enacts a minimum
speed limit for motor vehicles.
3 E. FREuNan, THE POLICE PowER 3 (1904).
4 To illustrate this implied limitation on the government's power with an absurd exam-
ple, assume that a city council wanted to punish a citizen purely out of spite because the
citizen opposed several of the councilmen in the recent election. It is ultra vires for the
council to enact an oppressive land-use regulation against this citizen to punish him. It
would also be improper for the council to use the city's compulsive power to attempt to
enforce the regulation or to tax the inhabitants to pay for all this foolishness. It is equally
ultra vires for the city government to use its eminent domain power to punish the citizen by
condemning his land. One would expect a court to declare any of the attempted acts void.
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American doctrine of substantial due process is a manifestation of this
limitation.5 A court will declare regulatory measures void if they are
found to be "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable," the word "unreason-
able" being an obviously broader term than "arbitrary" or "capricious."
The unreasonableness question breaks down into three parts:6 Does the
regulation serve some public end or purpose? If so, are the means
adopted reasonably necessary to attain that end? Are the means adopted
unduly oppressive upon the persons regulated? This final inquiry entails
a balancing of public needs and private interests. As with any legal doc-
trine that turns upon the word "reasonable," the substantive due process
test is a very flexible one involving highly subjective evaluations of mixed
questions of fact and law. Despite statements that the judiciary has a
narrow role in determining whether a regulatory measure serves a public
purpose,7 we must expect to find a great deal of seeming inconsistency on
similar fact patterns among the substantive due process opinions.
In addition to the constitutional due process limitation, it is generally
thought that a second limitation on the exercise of the police power with
respect to land is that it shall not, without compensation, amount to an
eminent domain "taking." This invokes the so-called eminent domain
clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution and the
equivalent clause in the constitution of every state except North Caro-
lina.8 These clauses provide that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.
To determine when, if ever, a regulation on land use amounts to a
"taking" is the sole aim of this article. More precisely, the aim is to work
out a test or doctrine for police power takings that courts can use under
existing conditions. That is, the aim is to derive a test from the underly-
ing nature and theory of eminent domain, including its constitutional as-
pects, that is consistent with the application of eminent domain theory to
"takings" that occur otherwise than by exercises of the police power. An-
other requirement is that the test for a "taking" shall not replicate or
overlap the judicial test for when a regulatory measure lacks substantive
I The genesis for the American doctrine of substantive due process is found in Lord
Coke's decision in Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P. 1610). In setting aside an act
of Parliament, Lord Coke based the decision on the power he discovered in the common-law
judges to declare a legislative act void if they found it "against common right and reason, or
repugnant, or impossible to be performed." Id. at 652.
" See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) ("the role of the judiciary in determin-
ing whether that power is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one").
' As a matter of interest, article I, section 17, of the North Carolina Constitution con-
tains the so-called "Magna Carta" formulation: "No person ought to be. . .deprived of his
life, liberty or property but by the law of land." This phrase, essentially a due-process state-
ment, has long been held judicially in North Carolina to guarantee compensation for emi-
nent domain "takings." See Note, Eminent Domain in North Carolina-A Case Study 35
N.C.L. REV. 296, 299-300 (1957). In fact, North Carolina is most liberal in granting compen-
sation. See especially Gray v. City of High Point, 203 N.C. 756, 166 S.E. 911, 915 (1932);
Hines v. City of Rocky Mount, 162 N.C. 409, 78 S.E. 510, 511 (1913).
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due process.
If the stated goal seems too narrow or modest, reflect on the fact that
the considerable effort invested by courts and legal writers pursuing that
goal so far have, to put it bluntly, come a cropper. In the most important
recent decision on the question, the United States Supreme Court, in ef-
fect, gave up on trying to formulate such a test.9 The court confessed that
it was "unable" to develop any "set formula" for a "taking" and then
proceeded to consider the case under several different approaches seia-
tim.o That is quite a concession considering that the subject is one of
constitutional dimensions and that most' of the leading cases have come
from the Supreme Court.' Consider also that the not inconsiderable'vol-
ume of recent writing on the subject by learned scholars in prestigious
law journals has mostly carried on private debate.
1 2
Because of the confused state of the law in this area, to make a useful
contribution on the subject of police power "takings" one must start with
basic eminent domain theory. To borrow a popular phrase, it is time to
"go back to the basics." The text that follows will proceed through several
steps. The first step examines and summarizes the main currents of judi-
cial doctrine and then the more important recent scholarly writings. The
article then identifies some of the deficiencies in these prior doctrines and
theories. A doctrine or test will be proposed that is based upon funda-
mental eminent domain principles. After applying the proposal, by way of
example, to several kinds of regulatory measures, the writer will, hope-
fully with a convincing air of confidence, explain why he feels the time is
ripe for courts increasingly to move to a doctrine' such as he proposes.
II. ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM
A. Judicial Doctrines
1. Valid Regulation Not A "Taking"
a. No exercise of police power is a "taking"
Quite a number of decisions hold police power regulations not to be
takings on the ground, stated or implied, that no such regulation can
amount to a taking. The origin of these decisions appears to be certain
passages in Chief Justice Shaw's noted opinion in the 1851 Massachusetts
'See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
" Id. at 123-28.
In truth, the collected decisions of the Supreme Court, and all other courts, leave the
subject as disheveled as a ragpicker's coat.
" There is one piece of writing that shows promise of influencing court decisions. See
Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Sax I]. See
also Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. State, 88 Wash.2d 726, 565 P.2d 1162, 1166 (1977); Fred
F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 350 N.E.2d
381, 385 (1976). The author of that piece, however, has abandoned his own thesis. See Sax,
Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L. J. 149 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Sax II].
1980] 1059
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case of Commonwealth v. Alger.13 In these passages Shaw emphasized
that the police power was "very different" from eminent domain."' There-
after, Mugler v. Kansas,5 decided by the Supreme Court in 1877, became
the leading authority for the theory that regulatory measures are not tak-
ings."' In Mugler, the Court reviewed a Kansas statute against the brew-
ing of beer that forced the defendant to close his brewery. The Court held
that, because this statute was a valid exercise of the police power,' 7 it did
not amount to a taking. The decision stands for the general proposition
that such regulations are not takings.'8
Since the time of Mugler v. Kansas, a sizable group of state decisions
apply the rule just stated. Some decisions explictly adopt the rule. 9 Nu-
merous other decisions, though not specifically stating the doctrine and
sometimes using qualifying language, are explainable only by the general
rule that regulations are not takings.
2 0
13 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851).
14 Other parts of the Alger decision form the basis for the "noxious-use" doctrine. See
text accompanying notes 21-26 infra.
15 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
Id. at 668. Mugler is the leading authority for the noxious-use doctrine. See text
accompanying notes 21-26 infra.
'7 The basis for the decision that the statute forbidding the brewing of beer was a valid
exercise of police power is that the legislature determined that the brewing of beer was a
public "evil."
Is The Mugler decision stands for the general rule that such regulations are not takings
even though, as the court noted, the statute only prevented certain activities on the land.
The statute did not prevent every use of the land nor did the state physically invade the
land. These same generalizations, however, equally apply to other land-use regulations so
that the broad reading of the Mugler decision is legitimate.
" City of St. Paul v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 413 F.2d 762 (8th Cir. 1969); Consoli-
dated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638
(1962); People v. Adco Advertising, 35 Cal. App. 3d 507, 110 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1973); Sher-
man-Reynolds, Inc., v. Mahin, 47 Ill. 2d 323, 265 N.E.2d 640 (1970); Jameson v. St. Tam-
many Parish Police Jury, 225 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 1969) (dictum); People v. Raub, 9 Mich.
App. 114, 155 N.W.2d 878 (1967); Board of Supers. v. Abide Bros., Inc., 231 So. 2d 483
(Miss. 1970) (dictum); Markham Advert. Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968);
Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955). For example,
in Markham Advertising Co., the court stated that "[w]hen a court determines, as we have
in this case, that the police power has been properly invoked, there is no basis for this
contention [that a taking occurred]." 439 P.2d at 621.
20 See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Candlestick Props., Inc. v. San
Francisco Bay C. & D. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970); National
Advertising Co. v. State Highway Dep't, 230 Ga. 199, 195 S.E.2d 895 (1973); State v. Dia-
mond Motors, 50 Haw. 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967); Cobin v. Pollution Control Bd., 16 Ill. App.
3d 958, 307 N.E.2d 191 (1974); Sibson v. State, 111 N.H. 305, 282 A.2d 664 (1971); Mansfield
& Swett, Inc. v. Town of West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 198 A. 225 (1938); Whitmier & Ferris
Co. v. State, 20 N.Y.2d 413, 284 N.Y.S.2d 313, 230 N.E.2d 904 (1967); Rochester Poster
Advertising Co. v. Rochester, 38 App. Div. 2d 679, 327 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1971); New York State
Water Resources Comm'n v. Liberman, 37 App. Div. 2d 484, 326 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1971); State
v. Yard Birds, Inc., 9 Wash. App. 514, 513 P.2d 1030 (1973). See also United States v.
Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958) (wartime government order closing all gold
mines was not a taking); Village of Willoughby Hills v. Corrigan, 29 Ohio St. 2d 39, 278
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A reminder is appropriate at this point. The regulated owner still has
a legal remedy even if we apply a rule that an exercise of the police power
is not a taking. This general rule only says that the governmental act is
not an exercise of the eminent domain power. As an alternative theory,
the court is still free to conclude that the regulation is void as lacking
substantive due process.
b. Noxious-use test
The "noxious-use" test of taking traces back to Commonwealth v. Al-
ger2 1 and Mugler v. Kansas.22 Though categorized as a separate taking
doctrine, 3 such categorization implies a misconception of the principles
of due process and eminent domain.2 4 Stated succinctly, the noxious-use
test says that a regulation on land use is not a taking if it is to control
some "evil" or some "noxious" use the owner is making of the land.
Courts in recent years have chiefly stated the noxious-use test in cases
involving required subdivision dedications. If a governmental agency, as a
condition to approving a plat, requires the subdivider to dedicate land
and perhaps also to install facilities for a road, a park, a school, or some
such public area, the subdivider might think that the government is con-
demning his land without compensation. Under the reasoning inAyres v.
City Council of Los Angeles,25 however, no taking occurs if the dedication
is necessary to correct or meet some increased demand created by the
subdivision, such as increased traffic. This demand is the "evil" created
by the owner's subdividing his land. The Ayres formula is the usual judi-
cial basis for justifying subdivision exactions though there is a great range
of opinion as to when a new subdivision creates or causes needs that the
subdivider should correct.2'
N.E.2d 658 (1972) (strange distinction between "takings" and "unconstitutional takings").
21 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851). See text accompanying notes 13-14 supra.
22 123 U.S. 623 (1887). See text accompanying notes 15-18 supra.
23 Sax I, supra note 12, at 48-50.
24 In fact, the noxious-use test merely focuses attention on one aspect of the substan-
tive due process inquiry. See text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.
25 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
2 E.g., Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 94 Cal. Rptr.
630, 484 P.2d 606 (1971), af'g 11 Cal. App. 3d 1129, 90 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1970); Aunt Hack
Ridge Estates v. Planning Comm'n, 160 Conn. 109, 273 A.2d 880 (1970); Pioneer Trust &
Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961); Schwing v.
City of Baton Rouge, 249 So.2d 304 (La. App. 1971); Billings Props., Inc., v. Yellowstone
County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78,
218 N.E.2d 673 (1966); McKain v. Toledo City Plan Comm'n, 26 Ohio App. 2d 171, 270
N.E.2d 370 (1971); Crownhill Homes, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 433 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1968); Jordan v. Village of Monomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965).
Cf. City of Corpus Christi v. Unitarian Church, 436 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). See
also Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 104 Cal. Rptr. 866 (Cal. App. 1972),
rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799, 514 P.2d 111 (1973); Brazer v. Borough of
Mountainside, 55 N.J. 456, 262 A.2d 857 (1970). Note that one occasionally sees brief refer-
ences in other kinds of cases to a finding that the land-use regulation in question either does
19801 1061
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The noxious-use test is a false test of whether a taking has occurred. It
is in fact a test of whether the regulatory measure addresses a problem
that the government might legitimately try to solve. That is, the test ac-
tually focuses on whether the regulatory measure was lacking in substan-
tive due process. If the state has no legitimate privilege to correct the
problem-either the problem did not exist or was not remediable by the
state-then the state's act is void. In that event, there is no regulation
left to amount to a taking. Thus, the noxious-use test is a perfectly tau-
tologous restatement of the rule that no valid exercise of the police power
is a taking. Since we can face a taking question only when the regulation
is valid in the due process sense, the supposed noxious-use test simply is
a restatement of the doctrine of the preceding subsection, that no exercise
of the police power amounts to a taking.
2. The "Too Far" Test
At odds with the doctrines just discussed is the so-called "too far"
test. This test traces back to Justice Holmes' majority opinion in Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.27 Pennsylvania's Kohler Act prohibited coal
mining that caused the surface to subside. Because of this prohibition,
the coal company, which owned only the severed strata of coal, was for-
bidden to mine in the vicinity of Mahon's house. This prevented the coal
company from making any use of the underground layer it owned. This
regulation, according to the Court, was a "taking" under the fifth amend-
ment because it went "too far." The regulation went too far because it
destroyed or nearly destroyed all the rights of use and enjoyment this
owner had of its severed estate. As the Court acknowledged, whether a
taking occurs is a matter of degree turning on the facts of each case. Jus-
tice Brandeis, dissenting, argued mainly for the doctrine of Mugler v.




Some very plain observations are in order concerning the doctrine of
Mahon. Courts and commentators have not plainly made these observa-
tions, perhaps out of deference to the opinion's author, perhaps because
of the popularity of the doctrine. First, whether a regulation becomes a
taking is a matter of degree depending mainly upon the extent to which it
restricts the owner's exercise of whatever property rights he has. Second,
or does not relate to a condition on an owner's land that poses a public threat. See, e.g.,
Gates Co. v. Housing Appeals Bd., 10 Ohio St. 2d 48, 225 N.E.2d 222 (1967); Just v. Mari-
nette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
s' 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Precursors of Pennsylvania Coal, which show the development
of Justice Holmes's thinking, are Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921), and Rideout v. Knox,
148 Mass. 368, 19 N.E. 390 (1889). Holmes used the phrase "too far" in Block but was not
that explicit in Rideout. Pennsylvania Coal, it seems, was the culmination of years of
thinking.
123 U.S. 623 (1887); see text accompanying notes 15-18 supra.
"See 260 U.S. at 417-18.
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the measure of the degree of restriction is inevitably likely to be a per-
centage of diminution of money value of the owner's interest. Third, as
long as one does not require a total prohibition on use-as long as some
qualifier such as "very nearly destroyed" appears-the "too far" test is
inescapably vague. Finally, Mahon is hopelessly at odds with Mugler v.
Kansas. The United States Supreme Court placed in its constitutional
grab-bag a doctrine contrary to Mugler's, though the Court to this day
refuses to acknowledge this contradiction. Without choosing between
the two decisions, it must be said the decision in Mahon begins the era of
extreme confusion about police power takings that still exists. We will
have no peace about the matter until either Mahon or Mugler is over-
ruled or, as happened in New York,31 consigned to limbo.
There are variant forms of what seem to be essentially the "too far"
test. In some cases a court will decide the issue of whether a regulation is
a taking with clear reference to Mahon or its test.3 2 Many other decisions
state the test that a land-use regulation is a taking if it is "unreasonable"
or some similar adjective.3 3 Though "reasonable" is rhetorically different
from "too far" and though courts are often vague both linguistically and
analytically in these cases, they seem essentially to follow Mahon, espe-
cially when one coisiders the imprecison of any legal test couched in such
terms.
Somewhat less imprecise but still a sub-species of the "too far" test is
the doctrine of the famed case, Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatch-
er.5 " In Arverne Bay Construction, the New York Court of Appeals la-
beled a zoning ordinance a taking because the only uses it permitted were
not feasible on the particular land. Holmes, as evidenced in Mahon, obvi-
ously would have agreed. A taking occurs if the land-use regulation pre-
vents all feasible uses on the land. The decisions, especially zoning deci-
so See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
31 See Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 385 N.Y.S. 2d 5, 350
N.E.2d 381 (1976), in which the court said Mahon was really a due process case and its
language about a taking only a "metaphor." But see Spears v. Berle, 48 N.Y.2d 254, 397
N.E.2d 1304 (1979) (reasoning seems to be a reversion to a Mahon-like taking analysis).
32 See, e.g., Safer v. City of Jacksonville, 237 So.2d 8 (Fla. App. 1970); Bureau of Mines
v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co., 272 Md. 143, 321 A.2d 748 (Ct. App. 1974); Turnpike
Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 72 Mass. 1303, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1108 (1973); Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 53 Misc. 2d 933, 280 N.Y.S.2d 75 (S.
Ct. 1967), remanded for further testimony, 294 A.D.2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1968); Grosso
v. Board of Adjustment, 137 N.J.L. 630, 61 A.2d 167 (1948).
"See, e.g., Turner v. County of Del Norte, 24 Cal. App. 3d 311, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93
(1972) (semble); City of Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc., 141 Colo. 121, 347 P.2d 919 (1959),
overruled on other points, 500 P.2d 807 (1972) and 532 P.2d 720 (1975); William Murray
Builders v. City of Jacksonville, 254 So.2d 364 (Fla. App. 1971); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v.
County of Cook, 12 III. 2d 40, 145 N.E.2d 65 (1957); In re Spring Valley Development, 300
A.2d 736 (Me. 1973); Multnomah County v. Howell, 496 P.2d 235 (Ore. App. 1972); Spiegle
v. Borough of Beach Haven, 116 N.J. Super. 148, 281 A.2d 377 (1971) (semble).
.4 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
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sions 5 that apply the Arverne Bay test are legion.36 Some jurisdictions,
most notably Maryland, have recently taken the next step and announced
the rule that a land-use restriction will become a taking only when it does
deprive the owner of all feasible uses of his land.37 This may be a variant
of the Mahon test, though it certainly straitens what Justice Holmes
had in mind.
Quite a few decisions assert that a restriction on land use will become
a taking if it diminishes the market value of land too much.38 This too is
a variant of Mahon that attempts to put a price tag on the meaning of
"too far." Indeed, Holmes in Mahon seems to have been concerned
largely with the coal company's loss of value. Some investigators think
that, on average, compensation is given when loss of value reaches about
two-thirds. Other writers are unable to find any such line.39 Many deci-
sions say that loss of value alone, which courts may denominate as
"mere" loss of value, will not constitute a taking.40 Some famous decisions
denied compensation though regulations caused loss of land values in the
range of 80 to 90 per cent.4 1 In any event, it means little to say courts "on
average" award compensation at a certain level of loss. If loss of value is
to have significance as a judicial test, a given appellate court must adopt
3 The Mahon decison has an enormous following, especially among zoning cases.
36 E.g., Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391
(1969); Samp Mortar Lake Co. v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 155 Conn. 310, 231 A.2d
649 (1967); Corthouts v. Town of Newington, 140 Conn. 284, 99 A.2d 112 (1953); Tuggle v.
Manning, 224 Ga. 29, 159 S.E.2d 703 (1968); Metropolitan Bd. of Zoning App. v. Gateway
Corp., 256 Ind. 337, 268 N.E.2d 736 (1971); Morris County Land Imp. Co. v. Parsippany-
Troy Hills Tnp., 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963); Kozesnik v. Montgomery Tnp., 24 N.J.
154, 131 A.2d 1 (1957); In re Charles v. Diamond, 42 App. Div. 232, 345 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1973);
Salamar Bldrs. Corp. v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y.2d 221, 275 N.E.2d 585 (1971); Stevens v. Town of
Huntington, 20 N.Y.2d 352, 283 N.Y.S.2d 16, 229 N.E.2d 591 (1967).
17 Wright v. City of Littleton, 483 P.2d 953 (Colo. 1971); Spaid v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 259 Md. 369, 269 A.2d 797 (1970); Montgomery County v. Laughlin, 255 Md. 724,
259 A.2d 293 (1969); Norbeck Village Joint Venture v. Montgomery County Council, 254
Md. 59, 254 A.2d 700 (1969); Tauber v. Montgomery County Council, 244 Md. 332, 223 A.2d
615 (1966); Village House, Inc. v. Town of Loudon, 114 N.H. 76, 314 A.2d 635 (1974); Flana-
gan v. Town of HoUlis, 112 N.H. 222, 293 A.2d 328 (1972). See also Just v. Marinette
County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (though reciting "too far" test, held swamp
preservation ordinance did not go too far when it required an owner to leave swamp lands in
their natural condition, i.e., forbade all development; use of the land in its natural state is
still some use).
E.g., Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Turk's Auto Corp., 254 Ark. 67, 491 S.W.2d
387 (1973); Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964);
Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424, 244 N.E.2d 700
(1969).
See F. BossELMAN, D. CAuasns & J. BANTA, THE TAKING IssuE 208-10 (1973).
E.g., Arnold v. Prince George's County, 270 Md. 285, 311 A.2d 223 (1973); Bonds v.
City of Webster Groves, 432 S.W.2d 777 (Mo. App. 1968); Oriental Boulevard Co. v. Heller,
58 Misc. 2d 920, 297 N.Y.S.2d 431 (S. Ct. 1969). See also Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S.
503 (1944).
"I E.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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an exact percentage figure as a rule of law in its jurisdiction. There is no
suggestion that any appellate court has adopted such a figure. It is there-
fore doubtful that the seeming quantification of the "too far" test makes
it less vague.
3. Balancing As A Test
Some courts, in determining whether an exercise of the police power
amounts to a taking, balance the urgency of public need for the regula-
tion against the degree of loss to the regulated landowner.4 2 It is not clear,
however, that there is an express balancing test in determining whether a
regulatory measure amounts to a taking. Some legal scholars recognize
that such a test exists. 8 Perhaps it is better to say there is a balancing
"strain" running through some eminent domain opinions.
Balancing is a false taking test. It is simply a somewhat imprecise re-
statement of Lawton v. Steele's" still classic three-part test of substan-
tive due process. That test requires a finding that the interests of the
public require such interference, that the means are reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose, and that the means are not un-
duly oppressive on the individuals.4 8 Mahon focuses on the third part of
this test by saying that a regulation may so oppress the individual that it
amounts to a taking regardless of the fact that the regulation meets the
first two parts of the test. The balancing test, however, appears substan-
tially to restate the three parts of the Lawton v. Steele test and is just
another way of saying that a regulation must meet substantive due pro-
cess requirements.
Balancing is also too "dangerous" to function as a test for a police
power taking. Balancing allows the government to destroy real property
rights completely, even to appropriate land physically, provided the pub-
lic necessity is urgent enough. It is contrary to our entire concept of emi-
nent domain to say that urgent necessity will justify an uncompensated
taking when a less pressing public purpose will not. Even when the gov-
ernment acquires land for military defense, surely a most urgent need,
42 E.g., Turner v. County of Del Norte, 24 Cal. App. 3d 311, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1972);
William Murray Builders, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 254 So.2d 364 (Fla. App. 1971); Trust-
ees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 53 Misc. 2d 933, 280 N.Y.S.2d 75 (S. Ct. 1967). Under
the balancing inquiry, a court examines the regulation to determine whether the regulation
is too oppressive on the regulated landowner given the public's need for the regulation. If
the reviewing court finds the regulation to be too oppressive then it will constitute a taking.
Presumably, dire public necessity will justify an extensive loss of use and enjoyment, or of
value, to the regulated landowner. A slight public benefit is justification for only a slight loss
to the landowner.
43 Dunmham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court
Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. Rnv. 63 [hereinafter cited as Dunham]; Van Alstyne,
Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44
So. CAL. L. REV. 1, 37-41 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Van Alsytne].
" 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
45 Id. at 137.
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they must pay for it.4" It is one thing to employ Lawton v. Steele's bal-
ancing test for the due process validity of a governmental act, but it is
quite different and wholly inappropriate to use this inquiry as a test for
an eminent domain taking. Physical appropriation without compensation
would result whenever an imperative public need exists. That no court
would reach this result returns us to our former point, that balancing is a
false test.
4. False Taking Tests
There are at least two doctrines that are not properly a part of emi-
nent domain that courts nevertheless often confuse with that concept.
Though these doctrines are not strictly within our subject, they are dealt
with here chiefly to eliminate them from further consideration.
a. Lack of public purpose
A few opinions contain language suggesting that a police power regula-
tion becomes an exercise of eminent domain if it is lacking in a public
purpose. 7 These statements, which often are only allusive and not deci-
sive, confuse eminent domain with due process. The existence of a public
purpose is really one of the elements in the test for due process. 4' The
question of public purpose goes to the question of whether the govern-
mental entity has the power to impose the particular regulation. A regula-
tion is void if the answer to the due process question is negative, and one
need not-cannot-then ask if the regulation is a taking. Should the an-
swer to the due process question be affirmative, then one may go on to
the taking issue. If public purpose is considered again at this stage, the
taking issue becomes a replay of the due process questions. It follows,
therefore, that public purpose vel non is not a test of whether there is a
taking.
b. Emergency doctrine
There is an old doctrine in our law that allows public officials, in cer-
tain situations, to destroy improvements on privately owned land without
paying compensation. We may call this the emergency doctrine. The ar-
4 The emergency doctrine, which allows the razing of improvements on land to prevent
the spread of a conflagration or the like, does not disprove the fact that the government
must pay for condemned land even when there is an urgent public purpose. See text accom-
panying notes 49-54 infra.
41 E.g., Harbor Farms, Inc. v. Nassau County Planning Comm'n, 40 App. Div. 2d 517,
334 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1972); Pure Oil Div. v. City of Brook Park, 26 Ohio App. 2d 153, 269
N.E.2d 853 (1971); Town of Glocester v. Olivo's Mobile Home Court, 111 R.I. 120, 300 A.2d
465 (1973); Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enterprises, 214 Va. 235, 198 S.E.2d 600 (1973).
48 These statements, in effect, ask whether a regulation serves a public purpose and
whether that purpose is one to which the promulgating governmental body may address
itself. These questions fall under the three-part substantive due process test of Lawton v.
Steele. See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra.
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chetypal example is the power of the fire department to tear or burn
down a private building in the path of a conflagration to form a firebreak.
By extending this doctrine, the Supreme Court upheld the uncompen-
sated destruction of Caltex's petroleum facilities during the Japanese in-
vasion of the Philippine Islands.4 9 A more frequent example is the power
of governing authorities to order the razing of a dangerous building8 0 A
court may also see the razing of such a buildiiig as the abatement of a
public nuisance. Unlike the case of the unoffending house caught in the
path of conflagration, the court may consider the structure's owner to be
a wrongdoer. Either analysis seems to fit."'
Upon first examination it appears that the acts of destruction con-
ducted by the government under the emergency doctrine are acts of emi-
nent domain. Courts sometimes speak of the emergency power as an ex-
ception to the normal rule of compensation. This is nearly correct, but
not quite. The power to raze houses in a conflagration was historically one
of the long list of ancient prerogative powers of the English crown which,
like most of the prerogatives, the crown could exercise without compensa-
tion. Most of the prerogatives have disappeared as a separate institution,
and others are now a part of eminent domain. 52 The emergency power,
however, has survived not so much as an exception to the normal rule of
compensation but as the survivor of an older institution.53 Thus, when a
government agency employs the emergency power it is not engaging in an
act of eminent domain."
4 See United States v. Caltex, Inc. 344 U.S. 149 (1952). For exhaustive reviews of the
prerogative power-and a result, by a divided court, contrary to Caltex-see Burmah Oil
Co. v. Lord Advocate, [1964] 2 All E.R. 348 (H.L. 1964).
" See Urciolo v. Washington, 305 A.2d 252 (D.C. App. 1973); Ajamian v. Township of
North Bergen, 103 N.J. Super. 61, 246 A.2d 521 (1968); Horton v. Gulledge, 277 N.C. 353,
177 S.E.2d 885, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 952 (1970).
so The emergency doctrine, though not always clearly articulated, may help explain
some confusing cases. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (burning cedar trees
to prevent cedar rust's killing apple trees); Bowes v. City of Aberdeen, 58 Wash. 535, 109 P.
369 (1910) (compulsory filling of marshy land). But see Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (discussion of Miller v. Schoene as though the court did not
decide on the emergency doctrine).
5, An example of a royal prerogative that is now a part of eminent domain is the power
to build lighthouses or fortifications on private land.
53 See Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REv. 553, 562-65
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Stoebuck, Eminent Domain]. Some courts recognize that the
emergency doctrine is not an exception to the normal rule of compensation but is the survi-
vor of an older institution. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16
(1922) ("as much upon tradition as upon principle"); Ajamian v. Township of North Bergen,
103 N.J. Super, 61, 246 A.2d 521, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 952 (1968).
"It .is impossible to categorize some cases in which courts decide whether a particular
land-use regulation amounts to a taking. These decisions reach unsupported holdings that
are conclusionary and lack a doctrinal or theoretical basis. Some of these decisions strike
down the regulatory measure. See, e.g., Shaffer v. City of Atlanta, 223 Ga. 249, 154 S.E.2d
241, a/I'd 223 Ga. 630, 157 S.E.2d 630 (1967); Gordon v. City of Warren Planning & Urban
Renewal Comm'n, 29 Mich. App. 309, 185 N.W.2d 61 (1971), a/I'd 388 Mich. 82, 199 N.W.
2d 465 (1972); Central Advertising Co. v. City of Ann Arbor, 42 Mich. App. 59, 201 N.W.2d
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5. Throwing In The Sponge: "No Single Test"
In 1978, the Supreme Court, after 91 years of producing nearly all the
leading police power taking decisions, essentially gave up. Viewing the
facts of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York55 as
presenting a question of police power takings, the Supreme Court an-
nounced that there was no "set formula" to resolve the question. Rather,
said the Court, different fact patterns require different approaches for so-
lution. The Court, however, did not seek to find the approach best suited
for the fact situation before it. Instead, the majority opinion focused on
various lines of analysis that the Court had used in some of its famous
decisions." These decisions are not all in harmony and Penn Central
presented an opportune occasion to resolve the conflicts. This is particu-
larly true of the conflict between the Mahon and Mugler decisions.
57
What the Court did, however, was seemingly to treat the variant doctrinal
approaches as alternatives. The Court concluded that under Penn Cen-
tral's facts there was no taking under any of the alternatives.
There the matter rests. A dissenting opinion by Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens, proposes what
amounts to an attempt to form a taking doctrine that accommodates both
Mahon and Mugler. A regulation that destroys property rights such as
the airspace rights in Penn Central amounts to a taking except in two
situations: when the regulation is necessary to prevent the owner's using
the land in a way injurious to the public health, safety, or morals5 8 or
when the regulation covers a large area, as zoning does, so that a given
owner gains a "reciprocity of advantage" by the regulation of his neigh-
365 (1972), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 391 Mich. 533, 218 N.W.2d 27 (1974). Other
decisions uphold the regulatory measure. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926); Central Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Miami Beach, 392 F.2d 549 (5th
Cir. 1968); Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Minnetouka, 281 Minn. 492, 162
N.W.2d 206 (1968); Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y. 2d 359, 285 N.E.2d
291 (1972). Results alone, however, do not give us much aid in expounding a doctrine for
police power takings.
-- 438 U.S. 104 (1978). New York City designated Grand Central Station a "landmark"
and denied its owner a permit to erect a building in excess of fifty stories on an arch above
it. The city's Landmarks Preservation Law allowed the owner to transfer the development
rights thereby lost to certain other sites, of which the owner owned several, thus permitting
development that would otherwise be excess on those sites. The New York Court of Ap-
peals, following its analysis in Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d
587, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 350 N.E.2d 381 (1976), treated the legal question as one of substantive
due process not one of eminent domain. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42
N.Y.2d 324, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (1977), aff'd 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The Su-
preme Court, however, analyzed the issue as one of a regulatory taking. 438 U.S. at 131-33.
56 The cases examined by the Supreme Court in Penn Central included Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357
U.S. 155 (1958); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); and Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623 (1887).
'7 See text accompanying note 30 supra.
58 This exception has its basis in the Mugler decision.
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bor.59 Whatever the merits of this doctrine, it fails to accommodate
Mugler and Mahon. Nevertheless, the formula in the dissenting opinion
is at least more coherent than the majority's attempt to straddle all the
old cases.
The Supreme Court's lengthy majority and dissenting opinions in
Penn Central compound rather than disentangle the doctrinal imbroglio
over when a taking occurs. To say, as the majority appears to, that a
number of alternative theories exist is, if taken on its face, to create a
situation of near anarchy. Landowners and their counsel not only would
have to test their facts by a known doctrine, they would, to get to that
point, have to determine which doctrine applied. It may be a case in
which too much law is worse than not enough. Justice Rehnquist's dis-
sent, which is not the law in any event, may present a clearer formula but
it fails to resolve the conflict in the Court's decisions that has existed
since Mahon. Until the Court resolves that conflict we are, in the final
analysis, just waiting for the other shoe to drop.
7. Summary Of Judicial Doctrines
Having reviewed the judicial tests for a police power taking, we can
now postulate a conclusion that may seem a bit of an anticlimax given the
welter of doctrines discussed above. There are only two basic contending
doctrines, one represented by Mugler v. Kansas and the other by Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, that courts use in determining whether there
is a police power taking.
Stated in their simplest, starkest form, Mugler v. Kansas and the nu-
merous decisions following it stand for the proposition that no exercise of
the police power is a taking; police power is one thing, eminent domain
another.6 0 On the other hand, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon stands for
the proposition that a police power regulation amounts to a taking if it
goes "too far" in diminishing the regulated landowner's property rights.
While this latter test is obviously different from Mugler's and will pro-
duce different results on some facts, it will not on all facts. The "too far"
test reduces the taking question to a matter of degree and to a mixed
question of fact and law, much like a test of reasonableness. It is not a
logical opposite to Mugler l but is different and in that sense
inconsistent.6 2
s' This second exception was part of Holmes' reasoning in the Mahon decision.
60 See text accompanying notes 13-20 supra.
' The logical opposite of the Mugler test, which we do not see in practice, is that every
exercise of the police power is a taking.
62 See text accompanying notes 27-41 supra. The Mahon test has some variants. One
variant, seen in zoning decisions, is that a land-use regulation goes too far and amounts to a
taking if it prevents all feasible uses. See Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278
N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938). Another variant is that a land-use restriction becomes a
taking if it too much diminishes the value of the regulated land. This test gives the appear-
ance of quantifying Mahon's "too far" test, but the appearance is false because courts have
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There are some other tests that courts refer to as "taking tests" which
are palpably false for that purpose. The so-called noxious-use test, which
holds that an exercise of the police power is not a taking if it serves to
remedy some "noxious use" or "evil" on the regulated owner's land, is
simply a statement of the test for substantive due process and is not a
test for taking at all. This test, essentially a restatement of the Mugler
test, merely says that a valid exercise of the police power is not a taking. 3
Similarly, the "balancing" test, which says that the occurrence of a taking
turns on balancing the public need for regulation against the degree of
restriction on the landowner, is nothing more than a restatement of the
test for substantive due process.' Another similar false taking test is that
a regulatory measure is a taking if it serves no valid public purpose. This
is really only a fragment of the balancing test and is still a test for due
process. Finally, courts sometimes confuse the "emergency doctrine" with
eminent domain. The emergency doctrine gives the government the
power to raze improvements on land to prevent a public castrophe. This
does not include an eminent domain issue at all because the governmen-
tal power involved is older than and separate from the power of eminent
domain.
We are thus left with only two basic judicial tests. Mugler holds that
no exercise of the police power is a taking. Mahon holds that an exercise
of the police power is a taking if it goes too far. Both of these cases and
the tests they represent come from the Supreme Court and both are still
"good law." Yet, the two cases are inconsistent.
B. Recent Scholarly Writings
For the past twenty years a number of American legal scholars have
sought to discover the touchstone, the leitmotiv, for defining a regulatory
taking. In 1962 Professor Allison Dunham's article in the Supreme Court
Review analyzed Supreme Court decisions on the subject.65 Subsequent
articles by other writers, viewing the subject broadly or in specific con-
texts, have been of a generally high quality. In approach they range from
high-level exegesis, through policy oriented, to philosophical. Somewhat
surprisingly, a careful examination will show that very little of this writ-
ing has had as its central focus the formation of a doctrine or test of
police power taking that courts might apply without the enactment of
new legislation. A review of those articles, however, is useful in fulfilling
the ultimate purpose of this article which is to formulate a definitive doc-
trine or test of police power taking.
not placed firm dollar or percentage limits on diminution of value.
" See text accompanying note 60 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra.
65 See Dunham, supra note 43.
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1. Non-doctrinal Writings
In the 1962 article just mentioned, Professor Dunham demonstrated
that the Supreme Court, author of most of the leading decisions on the
subject, had been unable to formulate a consistent test for police power
takings. Subsequent investigators are much indebted to him for thus di-
recting their attention to the problem that excites their concern. They are
further indebted to him for his conclusion, in which most of them share,
that existing doctrines were producing results that were unfair to many
owners of regulated land. Professor Dunham's particular objection was to
judicial formulas that turned upon defining the concept of "property." He
feared that "government," apparently referring to both the legislative and
judicial branches, might destroy landowners' rights to compensation by
manipulating this concept. Professor Dunham stated that compensation
should be given for any loss of market value that resulted from govern-
ment action to promote the public welfare. Market value, he felt, was a
more objectively demonstrable concept and was not as manipulable as
"property."66 Because Professor Dunham doubted a court's ability to fol-
low his or any consistent test of a taking, however, his final conclusion
was that Congress and other legislative bodies should devise statutory
tests. This conclusion also marks much of the subsequent writing on the
subject. Thus, while Professor Dunham certainly expressed a theory and
a test for police power takings, it is not a doctrinal statement as used here
because he did not address the doctrine to the courts.
It is an inviting idea to equate the economic concept of wealth with
the constitutional concept of property. Perhaps, strictly speaking, Profes-
sor Dunham would not redefine "property" to mean wealih; it is more
precise to say he would have legislatures substitute wealth, measured by
market value, for property. In this sense he would have legislatures' be
more liberal in allowing compensation than the langauage of the Consti-
tution requires. Recent legislation does follow Professor Dunham's sug-
gestions, for instance, by allowing compensation for such items as reloca-
tion expenses and business losses. There are, however, serious problems,
both theoretical and practical, with a rule that allows compensation to
every landowner who can prove that any governmental exercise of the
police power causes a measurable decrease in the market value of the
land .
7
Insofar as one might propose legislative adoption of the market value
test, the objections are that it is enormously expensive and, moreover,
leads to absurd results in many cases. Government can hardly do any-
thing, from adjusting interest rates to closing military bases to zoning,
that will not affect some landowners' market values. A good specific ex-
ample is the location of a new highway on the other side of town that
:6 Id. at 80-81.
7 No objection is made here to this recent legislation extending governmental largesse
to landowners. Any objection made would likely be on the ground of public cost.
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diverts traffic from an established motel on the old highway, drastically
reducing the motel's value. Under traditional analysis, though a court
might liberally allow compensation if the owner had his property right of
access to the abutting road blocked, the court will deny compensation for
what will be called a loss of nonproprietary traffic flow.68 Under a system
that allows compensation for loss of value alone, such an owner, suffering
a large and readily provable loss, would receive compensation for this loss
of traffic flow. This owner is not an isolated case. He is representative of
millions who suffer substantial value losses as an indirect result of gov-
ernment actions. It would be so intolerable in our society to award all
such persons that legislative bodies would surely construct an intricate
web of exceptions to the stated compensation principle. Is it even possible
that the "delivery" of compensation under such a system would be simi-
lar to what the present property-based system would look like with a lit-
tle legislative tinkering?
Professor Dunham does not propose that courts apply the market
value concept without legislative action. To do so would require consider-
able judicial liberties with the constitutional mandate that the govern-
ment award compensation for the taking of "property." When one keeps
in mind that it is only this constitutional mandate that requires compen-
sation, it is evident that the word "property" imposes a kind of outer
limit on the judicial award of compensation in the absence of legislation
that is more generous. Indeed, the existence of this constitutional man-
date makes certain kinds of eminent domain cases, police power cases
above all, a fascinating laboratory in which to explore the concept of
"property." Assuming a court would not feel free to ignore the constitu-
tional langauage, to reach Professor Dunham's suggested goal it would
have to make the concept of property coincide with the economic concept
of wealth. Besides creating problems of the sort described in the preced-
ing paragraph, this would cause serious dislocations in the judicial pro-
cess. How could a court justify such a large departure from normal prop-
erty concepts? Would there be one concept of property for eminent
domain purposes and another for other branches of law? These are only
examples of problems that would have broad repercussions.
This leads to another concern that Professor Dunham seems to have
in mind. He appears to fear that courts will manipulate the definition of
"property." Such concern loses sight of what "property" is. "Property" is
the product of 800 years of judicial manipulation. "Property" is, literally,
what the courts have made it. The concept of "property" is part of the
common law. It is not mere epithetical jurisprudence for the courts to
define and redefine the concept, constantly to mix new ingredients in the
old bottle labeled "property." Our system contemplates that the ingredi-
ents will change to, among other things, accommodate the needs of a
" See Stoebuck, The Property Right of Access Versus the Power of Eminent Domain,
47 TExAs L. Rlv. 733, 751 (1969).
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changing society. All we require of our judges is that they proceed in a
rational manner, retaining enough of the existing ingredients to give sta-
bility (this is the function of theoretical jurisprudence) and adding
enough new ingredients to meet the needs of society (that is the function
of policy-oriented jurisprudence). It is therefore no criticism to say that
our courts manipulate the concept of property in the context of eminent
domain. Considering the nature of the judicial process and the limits of
the fifth amendment, it is far better that they engage in such manipula-
tion rather than substituting "wealth" for "property."
Another article receiving a good deal of attention is Professor Frank I.
Michelman's article on the ethical foundations of compensation systems.69
His is certainly not any attempt to work out judicial doctrine; in fact,
Professor Michelman doubts that his article is even an essay on constitu-
tional law.70 Rather, it is an attempt to discover philosophical principles
that should govern a compensation system and to gauge how well the re-
sults of the existing American system measure up to those principles.
Professor Michelman proceeds by positing alternatively two ethical
theories, one a Benthamite utilitarian model and the other a "fairness"
model based upon John Rawls' theory of fairness."' It is not clear why
Professor Michelman chooses these two models or whether he would con-
sider other models unsuitable for his purpose. However that may be, he
describes what would be "efficient" compensation under the two models.
To a large extent the practical results of the two systems coincide, but in
some situations the results differ. Professor Michelnan gives an overview
of the applied principles of existing American compensation law, concen-
trating on the more difficult areas, particularly police power cases. His
conclusion is that while courts generally decide 6onsistently with his cho-
sen ethical system (systems?), in some areas "the courts fall too far short
of adequate performance to be left without major assistance from other
quarters."7 2 The "other quarters" include at least legislatures and possi-
bly administrative agencies. Professor Michelman does not spell out in
any detail the changes he would make to existing rules, but it is clear that
compensation would become available in more situations than at present.
Valuable as it has been for stimulating thought on underlying eminent
domain questions, the Michelman article is not "working the same side of
the street" as the present one. Whereas the present chosen aim is to for-
mulate judicial doctrine, Professor Michelnan regards the courts as in-
capable of applying his "fairness" standards.7 3 Like Professor Dunham,
he would turn to legislation to achieve the reforms he wishes.
9 Michehnan, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HAnv. L. Rpv. 1165 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Michelnan].
70 Id. at 1166-67.
7 See Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 PHm. REv. 164 (1958).
72 Michelman, supra note 69, at 1226.
73 Id. at 1246-53.
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Professor Arvo Van Alstyne's 1971 article, Takings or Damaging by
Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria,7 4 is prima-
rily a lengthy analytical exegesis of police power cases. The article covers,
without sharp differentiation, both due process and taking decisions. It is
a valuable presentation of the currents of American law in the areas men-
tioned. Professor Van Alstyne, however, does not attempt a new theory,
doctrine, or mode of analysis. Rather, he concludes with general descrip-
tions of legislative reforms he advocates in certain specified aspects of
eminent domain law and procedure. If his descriptions provide a rather
more explicit blueprint than do Professors Dunham's and Michelman's
suggestions, the end product urged is similar. All propose legislative re-
form. Professor Van Alstyne's reforms also have a tendency to liberalize
compensation awards. Again, however, his aim is not to advocate judicial
doctrine.
Two scholars whose writings, for our purposes, deserve mention to-
gether are Professors John J. Costonis and Donald G. Hagman. Both have
primarily concerned themselves with modes of compensation instead of
refining a judicial test for a taking and both make proposals that appar-
ently look to legislation for realization. Professor Costonis is, of course,
chiefly known for his pioneering work in advocating the granting of trans-
ferable development rights as a form of compensation in place of money
in certain cases in which land-use restrictions constitute takings. 75 In a
general way, his thesis is that governments may avert having their regula-
tions defeated as takings by voluntarily offering enough compensation so
that the regulations do not go "too far." To relieve the burden this would
impose on public treasuries, he would have compensation consist, at least
in part, of govermental concessions of special, or excess, development
privileges.7 6 Though Professor Costonis is not concerned with defining the
point at which regulation becomes a taking, he implicitly assumes that a
regulatory taking occurs when it goes "too far," as a matter of degree, in
reducing the value of the regulated land. He thus assumes a kind of
Mahon test.7 7 The important step for our purposes would be to have Pro-
fessor Costonis determine the threshold point at which the devaluation
passes over into a taking. The landowner could then receive compensa-
tion, in cash or in special development privileges, to bring his net worth
back up to or above (apparently not too far above) this point.
Professor Hagman, in Compensable Regulation: A Way of Dealing
7' See Van Alsytne, supra note 43.
75 See Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L. J. 75
(1973).
71 See Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accomodation Power: Antidotes for the
Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1021 (1975). In examining
this article, one should also consider Professor Curtis J. Berger's observations in The Ac-
comodation Power in Land Use Controversies: A Reply to Professor Costonis, 76 COLUM. L.
REv. 798 (1976).
7 See text accompanying notes 60-61 supra.
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with Wipeouts From Land Use Controls?,78 operates from premises that
are essentially similar to Professor Costonis' and also proposes somewhat
similar solutions. He, like Costonis, impliedly assumes that land-use regu-
lations pass over the "taking" threshold as a matter of degree.79 He too
advocates "regulation with compensation," the thesis again being that the
government can give enough compensation to ease the regulation's harsh-
ness to the extent that the regulation will cease being a taking. At this
juncture he would pay that amount of compensation in the traditional
form of money; he does not advocate the granting of governmental devel-
opmental permission in lieu of money. Like Professor Costonis, however,
he does provide a plan to ease the enormous burden all this compensation
would require. Professor Hagman would recapture some of these expendi-
tures by assessing those owners, other than those regulated, who have
their land values artifically enhanced by the regulations.
The last two writers have limited points of contact with the present
subject. The concern here is not with their central foci, modes of compen-
sation. Since our purpose is to determine when a taking occurs, these two
writers are important for their implied assumption that a taking is a mat-
ter of a regulation's going "too far" in diminishing the owner's land value.
The theory proposed later in this paper is very much in opposition to this
implied assumption."0
2. Doctrinal Writings
As hard a time as the courts have determining when regulatory mea-
sures amount to takings, one would suppose a host of scholars massed like
crusaders to battle false doctrine. Not so. This area of the law has only
seen small skirmishing. The main contributor has been Professor Joseph
L. Sax.
Professor Sax's first and most important article, Takings and the Po-
lice Power,8" (Sax I) came out in 1964. Professor Sax says the functions of
government fall into two categories. The government performs in an "en-
terprise capacity" in which it "acquires resources for its account." The
government also performs in an "arbitral capacity" in which it "governs"
or "mediates the disputes of various citizens and groups."82 His rule of
compensation thus follows:
The rule proposed here is that when economic loss is incurred as
a result of government enhancement of its resource position in its
enterprise capacity, then compensation is constitutionally re-
quired .... But losses, however severe, incurred as a conse-
quence of government acting merely in its arbitral capacity are to
73 54 U. DEmorr J. URs. L. 45 (1976).
70 Id. at 106-11 ("harsh regulation" may amount to a taking).
80 See subsection 11. B. infra.
61 Sax I, supra note 12.
81 Id. at 62.
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be viewed as a non-compensable exercise of the police power."3
Thus, the compensation question turns not upon the intensity of govern-
ment regulation, but upon which of two possible purposes that regulation
serves.
Professor Sax then distinguishes between the two government pur-
poses to show why compensation is appropriate for one purpose but not
the other. His basic thesis is that the function of compensation, histori-
cally and at present, was and is to prevent arbitrary or tyrannical use of
government power and not to prevent "value diminution." In other
words, payment for the full value of what the government appropriates
removes the sting from any punishment. It also will provide a disincen-
tive to take if the government must pay.
Professor Sax's historical proofs are not convincing. In tracing the his-
tory of compensation he, correctly, cites Grotius, Vattel, and Pufendorf,
the civil law writers who first discussed the jurisprudence of eminent do-
main. Incorrectly, however, he cites passages from their writings that deal
with the so-called public-use limitation. In fact, they were concerned with
the condemnee's economic position and specifically with the concept of
just share-that a citizen should not have to bear a greater share of the
cost of government than other citizens. John Locke, whose ideas underlie
much of American constitutional principles of eminent domain, had the
same concern. More to the point, the jurisprudents and the Constitution's
writers had in mind, as an end of itself, the protection of that form of
"value" represented by "private property." Professor Sax is simply wrong
sayng this was not the case."
The underpinnings of Sax I are also weak. First, it is self-evidently
illogical to say that compensation is to prevent tyranny and not "value
diminution." Without "value diminution" is there any tyranny? Second,
Professor Sax's aim was to show why the function of governmental re-
source enhancement requires compensation but the function of citizen
regulation does not. He must convince us that the same act of "value
diminution" will tyrannize, if not solely with the former category, at least
significantly more with it than the latter.
It seems there are two aspects to the tyranny question. The first is
whether a given deprivation tyrannizes or punishes an owner more if the
motive for it is to augment government's resources than if the motive is
to regulate among citizens. Motive is of little concern to the regulated
owner; it matters little to the person run over by a truck whether the
cause was brake failure or a broken tie rod.
The second aspect, apparently what Professor Sax has in mind, is
whether, if there is no requirement of compensation, government has
more temptation or motivation to regulate land to enrich its own re-
8 Id. at 63.
"' For a more elaborate explanation of the propositions in this paragraph, see Stoebuck,
Eminent Domain, supra note 53, at 566-68, 583-87.
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sources than to regulate, or adjust disputes, among citizens. If one were to
assume that the government uses its assets to produce profits for division
among officials who make regulatory decisions, i.e., legislators, then this
would be correct. In representative governments, however, the govern-
ment does not use public assets in this manner to any significant degree.85
Contrast two examples. In one, suppose the county is considering im-
posing airport approach zoning on owners around the county-owned air-
port, a step that under Sax I would trigger compensation because it would
enhance the county's property in the airport. In the second example the
county commission is considering environmental regulations, sponsored
by numerous environmental pressure groups, that would impose as severe
restrictions on land use as would the airport zoning. Considering the posi-
tion of an elected official in American government, it is not clear that the
owner is substantially more likely to have the regulation imposed on him
in the first case than in the second. In any event, it is very doubtful that
he is so much more likely to be tyrannized in the first example as to jus-
tify compensation in that case and not in the other.8s
The field once occupied by Sax I is now open for recapture because
Professor Sax has abandoned his original thesis. He modestly stated in a
1971 article (Sax 11) that he was modifying his views.8 7 Sax II is, in fact, a
wholly different theory bearing no resemblance in its formulation or re-
sults to Sax I. Though Professor Sax does not so bill it, Sax II is built
upon a nuisance model or upon an extension of the law of nuisance.
To get around the inhibition that the compensation requirement sup-
posedly imposes upon worthwhile regulations, Sax II proposes that we
recognize a form of property labeled "public rights" which would serve as
a counterbalance to the now-rampant private property rights. Govern-
ment, presumably as trustee of these "public rights," could assert them
against a private owner's real property rights. If the private owner's activ-
ities produce a "spillover" effect that interferes with these public prop-
erty rights, then the government can regulate him without compensating
him. This is because the regulation protects property of the public. The
derivation from traditional nuisance doctrine is obvious. "Spillover" is an
" Legislative motivation to regulate private owners to augment governmental assets
would decrease costs and increase the ease of government operations, which certainly would
have some attraction to legislators. On the other hand legislators, in theory, would consider
regulations designed to adjust conflicts among citizens from a detached, mental viewpoint.
In a representative government, however, with legislators aligned with various individual
citizens, interest groups, and constituencies, legislative detachment and neutrality seldom
exist.
8' Despite the criticism of the rule in Sax I, the doctrine formulated in the latter part of
the present article operates similarly to that rule. The two doctrines, though stated in differ-
ent verbal form, have meanings that are very close. These two doctrines of a police power
taking would produce the same results in nearly, though perhaps not quite, all cases. The
course of reasoning used to formulate the doctrine herein, however, bears no resemblance to
that of Sax I.
81 Sax II, supra note 12.
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extension of the nuisance concept of "unreasonable interference" with an-
other owner's property rights, with the "other owner" being the public. If
the government regulates an owner who does not produce "spillover,"
then he gets compensation.
To what extent Sax II makes an original or useful contribution to res-
olution of the "taking question" will be left to the reader's judgment. One
might ask, among other things, whether the analogy to nuisance law is
much the same as courts drew long ago in early zoning decisions, notably
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 88 Sax II has not had appreciable
impact on the courts, though it may have influenced two or three
writers.8 9 This is ironic for Professor Sax because, just as he was aban-
doning it, there were definite signs that the doctrine of Sax I was catching
on in the courts.90
Messrs. Fred Bosselman, David Callies, and John Banta, authors of
the book, The Taking Issue,91 give an exhaustive historical analysis of
American eminent domain law as it relates to the police power; the book
provides the best introduction to the subject for those who come to it for
the first time. Then follow five chapters, each outlining a different "strat-
egy" governmental lawyers might use in meeting the challenges of land-
owners who seek eminent domain compensation on account of land-use
regulations. The authors do not necessarily endorse any of these "strate-
gies;" they only identify and explain them. Chapter 12 outlines the strat-
egy the authors refer to as a return to "strict construction" of the taking
clause of the fifth amendment. This is simply the doctrine of Mugler v.
Kansas92 which Messrs. Bosselman, Callies, and Banta state to be that "a
regulation of the use of land, if reasonably related to a valid public pur-
pose, can never constitute a taking.""' As they frankly acknowledge,
adoption of this principle would require overruling Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon."
These three authors are sometimes given credit for saying more than
they intended. We are indebted to them, not for personally advocating or
developing any theory, but for their contribution in presenting the
Mugler doctrine and its antecedents and sequels in an uncommonly clear
fashion. A particular contribution is that the authors frankly face up to
the conflict between Mugler and Mahon.
- 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
" See Large, This Land is Whose Land? Changing Concepts of Land as Property, 1973
Wis. L. PEv. 1029 [hereinafter cited as Large]; Plater, The Takings Issue in a Natural
Setting: Floodlines and the Police Power, 52 TEXAS L. REv. 201 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Plater].
90 See especially Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y. 2d 587, 385
N.Y.S.2d 5, 350 N.E.2d 381 (1976); Maple Leaf Inv. v. State, 88 Wash. 2d 726, 565 P.2d 1162
(1977).
" U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973.
See text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 236 (1973).
Id. at 238; see text accompanying notes 27-31 supra.
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Except for some articles that deal with specialized problems,95 we have
now reviewed the legal literature that attempts to come to grips with the
problem of police power takings. The writings by Professors Dunham,
Michelman, Van Alstyne, Costonis, and Hagman do not attempt to for-
mulate judicial doctrine; in general, they advocate legislation. The book
by Messrs. Bosselman, Callies, and Banta, valuable as it is in sharpening
our understanding of existing doctrines and their uses, does not advocate
a particular doctrine or formulate a new one. Only Professor Sax at-
tempts to formulate a doctrine. That formulation has been influential in a
few judicial decisions. Professor Sax, however, has repudiated this earlier
doctrine. His new formulation, confusing and appearing to be only an ad-
aptation of ancient nuisance concepts in a new linguistic guise, has had
little impact. Can it not be said that nearly twenty years of scholarly con-
cern with police power takings has netted little help for the courts?
C. Deficiencies of Existing Theories
The two leading doctrines in the courts, that of Mugler v. Kansas and
that of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, are poles apart and evidence a
judicial impasse on the formulation of a taking doctrine. The Supreme
Court has been unwilling to abandon either pole or, if possible, to formu-
late a doctrine to bridge the gap between the two decisions. Even though
the Supreme Court's announced current position is that different fact
patterns require the application of different formulas, 9 in actuality these
formulas are only variants of Mugler or Mahon. Little wonder, then, that
the courts are confused.
Scholarly commentators have also had little beneficial impact on the
courts. Most writers suggest legislation as the way to cut the knot. It is
easier to conclude with a suggestion of legislation that will wipe the slate
clean than it is to try to persuade courts to change their doctrines, a gla-
cially slow process even if successful'. Legislation, however, is not occur-
ring in the area of police power takings. The legislative reform that has
taken place, though welcome, deals with liberalizing compensation for
displacement costs, business losses, attorney's fees, and the like. In the
meantime, the courts continue to struggle in the police, power cases, left
to their own doctrines to deal with a rising number of cases of zoning and
environmental regulations. The need for rational, workable, uniform
judge-made doctrine is not going away. It is more acute now than it was
fifteen or twenty years ago. At least until we reach the nirvana of omnis-
cient and universal legislation, we need doctrinal reform. A closer exami-
nation of the deficiencies of the existing doctrines is necessary before un-
95 See Large, supra note 89 (floodplain and swampland regulations); Marcus,
Mandatory Development Rights Transfer and the Taking Clause: The Case of Manhat-
tan's Tudor City Parks, 24 BUFFALO L. REv. 77 (1974) (transferable development rights);
Plater, supra note 89 (floodplain regulations).
0 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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dertaking that doctrinal reform.
1. Failure To Work Within Constitutional Principles
Eminent domain, not as it might exist in some imaginary state or as it
exists as part of a general theory of government but as it actually exists in
America, is a constitutional subject. It is possible, even likely, that our
courts would allow compensation in the absence of constitutional require-
ments. There are some famous examples of this.9 7 Nevertheless, the
United States Constitution (binding on the states through the fourteenth
amendment) and the constitutions of every state except North Carolina
contain a clause defining when governmental entities must give compen-
sation. These clauses are self-enacting; the courts must award compensa-
tion in the situations they describe even in the absence of further legisla-
tion. Certainly legislative bodies are free to adopt legislation allowing
compensation in categories in addition to those constitutionally re-
quired.9s In the absence of liberalizing legislation, courts, except within
the bounds of constitutional interpretation, are not free to grant compen-
sation in categories beyond those their relevant constitutions require.
Courts cannot legislate. It follows that any attempt to formulate a judicial
test of compensation for police power takings is, if it is to be useful to our
courts, essentially an exercise in constitutional interpretation.
A serious failing with much of the recent writing on the constitutional
subject of police power takings is that it ignores this constitutional per-
spective. Any doctrine that will be useful to the courts in this area must
come to grips with the constitutional concepts of "property" and "tak-
ing." That is so because the question is always whether a taking occurs;
the crucial queston is not the so-called "public use" issue or how much
compensation is due. If "property" is "taken," then an act of eminent
domain occurs. An analysis that will be helpful to the courts must try to
unlock the mysteries of "property" and "taking" in the context of land-
use regulations. Moreover, the analysis must, for the courts to use it, be
an application of accepted eminent domain principles. Of course the law
changes and grows; adaptability is the genius of the common law. But the
process is erosion, not earthquake; one can safely put a little new wine in
old bottles if it is mixed sparingly with old. To the large extent the writ-
ings fail to build upon the constitutional concepts of property and taking
they are not useful to the courts.
See e.g., Hines v. City of Rocky Mount, 162 N.C. 409, 78 S.E. 510 (1913); Gardner v.
Trustees of Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. 1816); Grant, The "Higher Law"
Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 Wis. L. REv. 67 (1931).
98 Legislatures, of course, cannot decrease the categories that constitutionally require
compensation.
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2. Failure To Make Theory Consistent With Other Areas Of Eminent
Domain
Too much writing speaks of police power takings in hushed tones.
These writings treat the subject as if it cannot be a part of the general
law of eminent domain. Instead, the emphasis should be on trying to see
how to adapt general principles of eminent domain to police power fact
patterns. Special study should be made of some fact patterns that are
closest to those in which land-use regulations may cause takings. The ref-
erence here is to that large group of takings known as "nontrespassory
takings," such non-physical invasions of private property as deprivations
of street access and condemnations by nuisance. It is easier to draw paral-
lels between the impact of such invasions and police power restrictions
than between police power acts and physical, or appropriative, takings.
Previous case law and writings do not use the suggested parallels to any
extent. This helps explain the general lack of connection between police
power takings and the larger subject of eminent domain and its princi-
ples. This article freely draws these parallels.
3. Failure To Give Proper Place To Due Process
Confusion over the proper role of substantive due process and over the
relationship between due process and takings is a pervasive problem in
judicial decisions and in scholarly writing. This confusion appears in sev-
eral ways, the most frequent of which is what may be called "blending."
Many decisions strike down land-use regulations on the stated ground
that they are "arbitrary, unreasonable, confiscatory, and void" or some
similar phrase. 99 Analysis of these words shows that "arbitrary" refers to
a governmental act that lacks due process and is thus "void." "Confisca-
tory" is, of course, a code word for "taking." "Unreasonable" refers to
acts that lack due process. Courts sometimes also use "unreasonable" as a
test of a police power taking. The best that can be said of decisions that
blend due process and eminent domain concepts is that they do not care-
fully analyze the words; it is not reasoning but a substitute for reason-
ing-little more than surplusage. If this is the best that can be said, it is
also the worst; a decision ostensibly based on such vacuous language is
scarcely better than an arbitrary conclusion.
There is a second way, less obvious but far more consequential than
that just discussed, in which courts, joined by some legal writers, confuse
police power takings with due process. The "too far" test of a regulatory
taking, originating in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,100 is a widely
used, if not the predominant, test. Variations of the Mahon test are "un-
" See, e.g., Corthouts v. Town of Newington, 140 Conn. 284, 99 A.2d 112 (1953);
LaSalle Nat'I Bank v. County of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 40, 145 N.E.2d 65 (1957); Kozesnik v.
Montgomery Township, 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d 1 (1957); Stevens v. Town of Huntington, 20
N.Y. 2d 352, 283 N.Y.S.2d 16, 229 N.E.2d 591 (1967).
1- 260 U.S. 393 (1922); see text accompanying notes 27-31 supra.
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reasonableness" and diminution in market value.101 Any such test re-
states, and is included within, the classic test for substantive due process
as formulated in Lawton v. Steele.1 0 2 The third part of Lawton's test was
that a regulation should not be "unduly oppressive upon individuals." If
the regulation fails to pass this part of the test, as well as either of the
other two parts, it is void for lack of due process.
Suppose a court is considering a regulation on land use. If the court
follows an orderly and logical development of the case it will first deter-
mine whether the regulation is void on due process grounds before enter-
ing upon an eminent domain issue. This order of proceeding is necessary
because if the regulatory measure is found void it will be unnecessary,
indeed logically impossible, to consider whether it amounts to a taking.
When the court passes upon the due process issue it will have to deter-
mine whether the measure is "unduly oppressive" to the regulated land-
owner. If the regulation is held to afford due process, the court will move
on to the taking question, assuming the landowner raises it, which he
nearly always will do. Under Mahon's test or its variants, the court will
then ask if the same measure goes "too far" or is "unreasonable" in its
restrictions on land use. Perhaps a metaphysician might try to distinguish
among "unduly oppressive," "too far," and "unreasonable," but it is fatu-
ous to suppose a court could formulate distinctions that would work in
resolving actual cases. In fact, it does not appear that any court has even
identified this problem. This probably accounts for those opinions, al-
ready described, where courts speak of regulations being "arbitrary, un-
reasonable, confiscatory, and void."
A few courts and some scholars make mention of a "balancing" test
for a taking. 03 The test balances the public need for a police power regu-
lation against the degree of loss it causes the regulated landowner to de-
termine if it constitutes a taking. As the previous discussion indicates,
this test overlaps Lawton v. Steele almost completely, even more so than
does the Mahon test. It is not necessary to labor the point but only to
observe that the problem with the Mahon test is more acute with the
balancing test.
4. Lessons To Be Observed
By examining the deficiencies in the existing police power taking tests
we can identify some of the ingredients a sound judicial theory should
include: (1) there must be a resolution of the impasse between Mugler v.
Kansas and Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon; (2) the theory must derive
from-must essentially be an interpretation of-existing constitutional
eminent domain clauses; (3) any doctrine advanced must be an applica-
',' See text accompanying notes 27-41 supra.
102 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
See text accompanying notes 42-45 supra.
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tion of principles applied in eminent domain law generally;10' (4) the test
of a police power taking must not replicate the test for a denial of sub-
stantive due process.
It goes without saying that a proposed doctrine must also be internally
consistent and logical. It must not produce results for the public or for
regulated landowners that are palpably unfair or extreme. Most of all, the
doctrine must be workable in the sense that, once stated, actual courts in
actual cases can apply it to produce consistent and predictable results.
With these goals in contemplation we turn now to our ultimate purpose
which is to formulate a judicial test for determining when an exercise of
the police power amounts to an eminent domain taking.
IlI. A JUDICIAL TEST FOR POLICE POWER TAKINGS
A. The Constitutional Elements
In the present state of American jurisprudence eminent domain is a
constitutional subject. It is essentially an exercise in constitutional inter-
pretation. Our chosen task happens to be to determine when a "taking"
of "property" occurs by reason of a police power regulation that inhibits a
landowner's use of his land. This is not unrelated, as some seem to
assume, to the larger or general question of when other governmental ac-
tivity causes a taking. There is a relationship, for instance, among the
appropriation of land for a road, the unreasonable diminution of an abut-
ting owner's street access, and a taking by a police power measure. More
to the point, since the eminent domain issues in all these cases relate to
one constitutional clause, there must be a definition or test of a taking
that fits all the cases. It thus becomes necessary to explore the controlling
elements at large. These elements are primarily the concepts of "taking"
and "property" with the question of what a taking is being the more cru-
cial and difficult. The ensuing discussion will emphasize these two con-
cepts. Also, an examination of the "public use" language is appropriate
because it may have some bearing on the taking question.
1. A "Taking"
The constitutional concepts of "taking" and "property" are inter-
twined. To discuss one sometimes requires the making of assumptions
about the nature of the other. In fact one of the persistent problems that
complicates most analysis of certain difficult eminent domain cases is the
failure of judges and legal writers to separate the two concepts. Rigorous
separation is necessary for analysis, but to some extent the discussion of
"takings" will have to anticipate the discussion of "property" that will
come in the next section.
The key to understanding the nature of a taking-and, candidly, the
I" Reference to categories of nontrespassory takings related to police power takings is
particularly useful.
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linchpin to the doctrine presently propounded-is the principle that an
exercise of eminent domain always involves a transfer of property. More
to the point, this transfer is from a landowner to an entity that has the
governmental power of eminent domain. Proof, more properly "demon-
stration," of this principle comes from an analysis of the way the Ameri-
can system of eminent domain functions. Moreover, this transfer princi-
ple has its basis in the constitutional language of a "taking."
Takings as transfers are, like many eminent domain principles, most
conspicuous in connection with physical, or appropriative, takings. If the
state condemns land for a road, public building, or some other physical
use, the court decree in the condemnation action operates to transfer an
interest in land from the owner to the condemnor. In fact, a perfectly
equivalent result occurs if the parties settle the action by the owner's giv-
ing and the condemnor's accepting a deed. Settlement in this fashion is
routine, of course, and no one supposes the condemnor acquires anything
more or less or different by the deed than by letting the action go to a
decree. This is easy to see when the governmental entity acquires a pos-
sessory interest, which usually means the fee simple estate. Nor do we
have any difficulty seeing the transfer when the interest acquired is an
easement for a street, road, utility line, or the like.
Things become a bit more complex when the act of eminent domain
occurs in the form of what one should call a "nontrespassory taking," eu-
phemistically sometimes styled a taking without a touching. Reference to
this type of taking is often by the term of "inverse condemnation," 10 5 but
that misplaces the emphasis for our purposes. This simply means the par-
ties are reversed from the usual order, with the landowner instead of the
governmental entity appearing as plaintiff. It happens statistically that
the vast majority of nontrespassory taking cases, including the police
power cases, are of the inverse sort. Governmental entities usually do not
commence nontrespassory taking actions, because they usually do not
plan for their nontrespassory acts to give rise to eminent domain compen-
sation. No matter what the order of the parties, the issue remains
whether the governmental action amounts to a taking.108
The most common example of a nontrespassory taking 0 7 may occur
when a governmental entity deprives a landowner who abuts on a land-
service street or road of all or part of his access to that public way. This
governmental act operates to create a transfer of a property interest with
the owner the transferor and the government the transferee. The abutting
owner had an easement of access from his land onto the public way. This
105 E.g., Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse
Condemnation Criteria, 44 So. CAL. L. Rav. 1 (1972).
100 There may be some contexts in which condemnation and inverse condemnation ac-
tions are not the same but these do not bear on our present inquiry. See United States v.
Clark, - U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 1127 (1980).
107 There is no need to attempt to make a complete listing of the ways in which non-
trespassory takings may occur. Two or three examples are sufficient.
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was an appurtenant easement, with his land being the dominant tene-
ment and the state's interest in the street being the servient tenement.
There is no novelty with this even if the state had only an easement for
the street because it is quite possible for one to have an easement upon
an easement as well as upon a possessory estate. When the government
partly or wholly destroys the owner's easement of access the owner is in
effect compelled to give the government a whole or partial release of the
easement. The landowner's property rights in his land, of which the ease-
ment was part, are diminished and the government's property interest in
the public way is correspondingly increased. There has thus been a trans-
fer of a property interest. The same result occurs if the owner gives the
governmental entity a deed of release. 108
As a second example consider what happens when a court awards a
landowner eminent domain compensation when governmental activity de-
nies him the benefits of a restrictive covenant. To visualize a typical fact
pattern assume that A, owner of the benefitted parcel, has a right that B,
owner of the burdened parcel, shall improve his land with nothing but a
single-family dwelling. A governmental entity acquires title to B's parcel
and constructs an office building, a clear violation of the restriction,
which we assume to be capable of running with B's title. Had a private
owner attempted or constructed the office building, A might have ob-
tained damages or enjoined construction. Since the state is the actor, A's
injunction action will not lie; at least there appears to be no decision al-
lowing such an injunction. In practice A will bring an action on the theory
that the government is engaging in an act of eminent domain by, in effect,
extinguishing his restriction on B's land. Some jurisdictions refuse to al-
low compensation in such a case with the usual ground being that A has
lost no "property" right. The majority, and better, position is that A's
rights against B's ownership are property rights, often styled a "negative
easement," the forced extinguishment of which entitles A to compensa-
tion. A closer analysis will show that the intervention of the governmental
entity diminishes A's property rights in his land because he no longer
possesses the right that the owner of B's land will build nothing except a
single-family dwelling. There is an increase in the state's quantum of
property rights in B's land by the lifting of this burden. The presence of
the governmental entity forces A to give the governmental entity a release
of the restriction with the same effect as if A gave a deed of release.
There is thus a compulsory transfer, the essence of an act of eminent
domain.10 9
A third and final example of the transfer principle in operation comes
from the field known as condemnation by nuisance. Thornburg v. Port of
10' See Stoebuck, The Property Right of Access Versus The Power of Eminent Do-
main, 47 TEx. L. REv. 733 (1969).
"I9 For details of and support for the propositions contained in this paragraph, see
Stoebuck, Condemnation of Rights the Condemnee Holds in Lands of Another, 56 IowA L.
REv. 293, 301-10 (1970).
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Portland,'1 the leading case, is useful in focusing discussion. Aircraft
landing at and taking off from a large public airport passed at low alti-
tudes near, but not directly over, the plaintiffs' land. This disturbance to
the plaintiffs' enjoyment of their land amounted to a nuisance as defined
in the law of torts. According to the Supreme Court of Oregon, this
amounted to an eminent domain taking.
Upon analysis it is clear that the disturbance caused the plaintiffs to
lose property rights and the governmental entity to gain rights. There was
thus a transfer. The law of nuisance gives landowners the right to be free
from nuisance committed by other owners. These rights are property in-
terests augmenting the landowner's quantum of rights in land. Of course
a landowner might surrender his right to be free from nuisance by grant-
ing another owner a privilege to commit some acts that otherwise would
be an actionable nuisance. This surrender might be by an instrument in
deed form. In that event it is accurate to say the grantor gives up prop-
erty rights and the grantee correspondingly gains rights for his land, a
transfer thus occurs between them. This is in effect what happened when
the Port of Portland compelled the Thornburgs to submit to the nui-
sance-type interferences. The Thornburgs lost rights they formerly had,
and the airport correspondingly gained."'
The three examples outlined above were chosen for two reasons. First,
they are probably the most difficult of all the categories of nontrespassory
takings in the sense that they require the most difficult and sophisticated
analysis to discover the property interests involved and to see transfers at
w6rk. Second, these examples appear to be factually the closest to those
fact patterns that may produce takings by exercises of the police power.
In fact, the loss of a street access, if caused by a traffic control regulation,
is actually an example of a police power taking.
To be more exact, the difficulty in analysis seems to lie in the nature
of the property interests involved. In all the examples, and also in the
case of police power regulations on land use, the governmental acts that
may give rise to a taking are nontrespassory. Of course Anglo-American
lawyers know that "property" consists, not of physical things, but of legal
rights concerning things. We all know that "property" is a construct, a
thing of the mind and not of the earth. Yet, whether from some traces on
our minds antedating our legal studies or from the popular use of the
word "property" to denote physical things, we find it easier to think of
property when a problem focuses attention on the physical aspect of
property. In the eminent domain setting, it is easier to see the property
interests affected when government physically invades private land than
when it does not. If this explains the essential difficulty in analyzing the
1 0 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962). See also Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 244 Ore.
69, 415 P.2d 750 (1966).
"' For details of and support for the matters contaned in this paragraph, see Stoebuck,
Condemnation by Nuisance: The Airport Cases in Retrospect and Prospect, 71 DICK. L.
REV. 207 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Stoebuck, Condemnation].
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various kinds of nontrespassory taking cases, it also explains why the
three examples given above bear a close resemblance to the police power
cases: all involve nontrespassory takings. More than a mere resemblance,
all these classes of cases share the same core quality, as brothers and sis-
ters share the same blood.
An eminent domain taking should occur in essentially the same way in
all these classes of cases. In all of them, the taking should have the same
aspects, including of course the aspect that a transfer must occur. Our
analysis of the three categories of nontrespassory cases then leads to this
conclusion: for a police power taking to occur, there must be a transfer of
property interests from a landowner to an entity having the power of emi-
nent domain.
It is possible to reach the same conclusion by another line of analysis.
As emphasized previously, American eminent domain law is a constitu-
tional subject and the process of constitutional interpretation gives us its
leading principles. We are now dealing with the word "taken" in a consti-
tutional phrase that typically reads, "private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation." Webster's Third New Interna-
tional Dictionary1"2 devotes over a full page of small print to the verb
"take." In the word's rich and varied meanings, it strongly suggests the
getting into one's possession, especially when used in the transitive form.
The word does not suggest merely the destruction or putting away of the
thing that is the object of the verb; it suggests a transfer of the object into
the actor's possession, power, or control.
This exercise in what is sometimes referred to as epithetical jurispru-
dence is concededly not in vogue among some legal scholars. However,
when one is dealing with statutory or constitutional provisions, linguistic
interpretation is the beginning point for further analysis. That is the
most appropriate occasion for careful definitional analysis. In this case
the normal meaning of the word "take" includes the notion of transfer; it
is not an unusual or strained meaning. Certainly the constitutional use of
the word supports strongly the conclusion previously reached that for
"property" to be "taken" there must be a transfer from condemnee to
condemnor.
A further line of inquiry is helpful in probing the meaning of "taken. '
This inquiry, unorthodox and tentative, is put forward in the spirit of,
"What do you think about this?" The constitutional langauge quoted a
few lines back says that "private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation." The question usually raised is whether
"public use" imposes a constitutional limitation on those purposes for
which government can exercise the eminent domain power. At one end of
the spectrum, represented by perhaps a handful of decisions, tending to
be old ones, is the rule that government can take only if the land is physi-
cally appropriated by the state and put to some physical use for the pub-
"12 WEBsTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2329-31 (1971).
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lic. This requirement would of course greatly restrain use of the power; it
would place a much greater restriction on eminent domain than on other
powers of government. At the other end of the spectrum is the notion of
Berman v. Parker s that "public use" means only that there must be
some public purpose, the same as there must be to justify any govern-
mental acts. Berman's view, likely pretty close to the prevailing view to-
day, would of course place no special restraints on the eminent domain
power. Note also that it would denude the words "public use" of specific
meaning, making them surplusage.
11 4
The question in the above paragraph assumes that one should read
the constitutional language as "private property shall not be taken except
for public use." Now, consider whether the words "public use" do not
limit exercise of the power but modify and describe "taken." In other
words, if "taken" implies a transfer from landowner to government, is it
possible that "public use" reinforces the idea that the transfer of "prop-
erty" must be to a governmental entity as trustee for the public? Can one
read the words to mean "compensation need be paid only when a taking
is for public use?" By impliction this reading would allow that some tak-
ings are for private use and some for governmental use but that there is a
requirement of compensation only for the latter. Of course, "public use"
would have meaning broader than physical appropriation or occupation;
it would include the principle that government may acquire private prop-
erty interests without possession.
Frankly, it is doubtful that the Constitution's writers had in mind
nontrespassory takings when they drafted early eminent domain clauses.
Scant historical records available tell very little about what they actually
said or thought about these clauses.1 11 It seems unlikely, however, that
they had the problem of nontrespassory takings called to their attention
since cases involving that problem did not come along until the 19th cen-
tury. Therefore, justification for the interpretation suggested above would
have to be in light of subsequent developments that could not have been
cognizable originally. This reading would do less violence to the syntax of
the constitutional clause than would the reading assumed in traditional
discussions of the "public use" phrase when, as noted above, Berman v.
Parker has largely destroyed any meaning. To the extent one finds the
suggested reading permitted and the arguments for it persuasive, the
words "public use" support the conclusion that a taking may occur only
when there is a transfer of property interests from a private owner to a
governmental entity.
Let us summarize the discussion of the nature of a "taking." We saw
'first that a transfer of property interests from owner to government al-
348 U.S. 26 (1954).
1 For further discusson of the "public use" question and reference to materials on it,
see Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REv. 553, 588-89 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Stoebuck, Theory].
Il Id. at 591-95.
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ways occurs in both trespassory takings and, more significantly for the
present inquiry, in those classes of nontrespassory takings most like po-
lice power takings. Second, the constitutional word "taken" includes
within its accepted meaning the notion that a thing is taken away from
one person and taken by the actor. Third, though the reading is tentative
and the argument not as strong as the two preceding, it is plausible that
the phrase "public use" may imply that a taking includes a transfer. That
conclusion is inevitable, both to give natural meaning to the constitu-
tional word "taken" and to explain how the American system of eminent
domain works.
2. The Concept Of "Property"
We now turn to an examination of the meaning of "property" in the
familiar constitutional eminent domain clauses. This is not as crucial a
step in the development of the doctrine being propounded as was the in-
terpretation of the word "taken," nor is it likely to be as controversial. It
is an essential step, however, because one of the great difficulties in ana-
lyzing any case of nontrespassory taking, including a police power taking,
is to see how governmental acts that do not physically touch land affect
an owner's property rights. One cannot find the transfer of anything un-
less he can visualize and identify the proprietary interests involved. This
shows the relationship between "taking" and "property."
As previously discussed, it is much easier to focus on the physical as-
pects of property. In the history of eminent domain law in America one of
the interesting and important developments has been the increasing un-
derstanding that takings may occur without physical invasion or appro-
priation of the condemnee's land. Through most of the 19th century the
courts, under the influence of decisions such as Callender v. Marsh 16 and
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Coons,11 7 would generally not allow com-
pensation unless a governmental entity somehow trespassed. "No taking
without a touching" became the popular notion. Nontrespassory govern-
mental acts, though they might infringe on an owner's exercise of real
property rights, were usually held non-compensable with the court label-
ing any damage "consequential."
On occasion one still sees the influence of the "touching" idea in emi-
nent domain decisions.11 8 In the main, however, the trend has been to-
ward increasing recognition of the possibility that acts of taking may oc-
cur with no physical invasion whatever.11 9 Thus, courts now award
compensation in a considerable variety of nontrespassory taking cases. In
I's 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 417 (1823).
1,7 6 Watts & Serg. 101 (Pa. 1843).
1s See, e.g., Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 955 (1963).
119 For a more detailed exposition of this trend and of some of the developments by
which it occurred, see Stoebuck, Theory, supra note 114, at 599-605; Stoebuck, Condemna-
tion, supra note 111, at 209-15.
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the prior discussion of the "taking" concept there were three examples of
nontrespassory takings, and the same examples will serve here to illus-
trate the involvement of "property." The three examples were loss of
street or road access,120 governmental violations of land restrictions,"1
and condemnations by nuisance. 22 In fact, the previous discussions antic-
ipated to a considerable extent the present subject of property rights.
When a governmental entity wholly or partially blocks an abutting
owner's street access by either physical barriers in the public right of way
or by regulation there is no touching of his land. Yet, the government act
denies the exercise of a recognized property right, an easement of access.
The right the owner enjoys in the easement, like all property rights, is not
a physical thing though it pertains to, and is appurtenant to, his physical
land. Since he can have no easement upon his own land but only upon the
adjoining street, the loss can occur only by an off-premises act. It would,
in fact, be impossible to destroy an easement by an act of trespass; it not
only may be, but must be, by a nontrespassory act.
Similarly, when a governmental agency prevents the owner of parcel A
from exercising a use restriction he has against parcel B, the act causing
the loss must occur on parcel B. The right lost, though appurtenant or
beneficial to parcel A, was exercisable only over parcel B and subject to
interference only by acts on parcel B. Also, when a court allows the cause
of action, governmental activities of the nuisance type may cause a tak-
ing. Once again no trespass occurs. The acts constituting a nuisance al-
ways occur outside the plaintiff's land boundaries. His complaint, how-
ever, is that he has lost a property right in his own land. The right is the
right to be free from nuisances.
All of the foregoing examples force us to see property rights for what
we know them truly to be, legal constructs, creations of the minds of
judges and lawyers through the centuries. We have this understanding of
"property" from our first days as students of the law. We have today
reached the point in eminent domain law at which we can say there is
recognition of the non-physical nature of property. That, of course, is one
implication of the nontrespassory taking decisions.
When we consider the possibility that a police power regulation might
cause a taking of property we are dealing with the purest case of a non-
trespassory, non-physical act. Some kinds of nontrespassory takings, usu-
ally including the three examples discussed above, at least involve physi-
cal activities outside the condemnee's land. But an exercise of the police
power, essentially a legislative action, has no physical aspect whatever;
the action is complete in the legislative council chamber. Therefore, we
must come to grips with an entirely non-physical taking. Actually that is
not as difficult a task as it might seem if we bear in mind that non-physi-
cal as well as physical acts can take the landowner's property rights, these
"I See text accompanying note 108 supra.
121 See text accompanying note 109 supra.
,' See text accompanying notes 110-11 supra.
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rights being ideal constructs. The key is to identify the property interests
involved. It turns out that these interests are easier to identify than in
some other nontrespassory taking cases, especially the cases of condemna-
tion by nuisance. The property interests affected by a police power regu-
lation are simply the regulated landowner's rights of use and enjoyment.
Any regulation that impacts him will diminish or destroy some. of these
property rights.
B. The Test for a Police Power Taking
1. The Test Stated
Certain conclusions are evident from the preceding discussion. Any
exercise of the eminent domain power, be it by trespassory or nontrespas-
sory acts, may occur only if certain phenomena are present. There must
be some activity by an entity. having the power of eminent domain,
though this activity may be nontrespassory or trespassory. A legislative
act, specifically, a police power regulation, may be such an activity. The
governmental activity must diminish a landowner's property rights. These
property rights include the rights of use and enjoyment. More than a di-
minishing of property rights, there must also be a transfer of property
rights from the owner to the governmental entity. Note that these conclu-
sions flow from the typical constitutional language, "private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." They also
describe the actual operation of the American system of eminent domain
in all cases of trespassory or nontrespassory takings with the exception of
police power takings, now to be discussed.
There is no difficulty in seeing how governmental activity, regulation,
diminishes a landowner's property rights of use and enjoyment. The diffi-
culty, peculiar to police power activities, is in seeing how or when a trans-
fer of property rights passes to the government. Loss to the owner is
plain; gain of property by the government is not. The government can be
a transferee in one of two ways. The first way is by acquiring rights in the
condemnee's land that the government can exercise on that land, e.g., a
road easement. The second way is by having an -interest it already owns
in other land augmented by diminishing the owner's rights, e.g., blocking
an access easement the owner had upon a street. A regulatory measure
does not work a transfer in the first mode for it gives government no right
to make any use of the regulated owner's land. Whether government can
receive the transfer in the second mode is a complex question that re-
quires closer analysis.
What is the nature of a land-use regulation? Its counterpart in real
property ownership terms is a restriction on land use or a restrictive cove-
nant. For instance, the impact on the owner is the same from having a
single-family dwelling zoning ordinance as having a burdening restrictive
covenant to that effect. At least the effect to diminish his totality of
rights of use and enjoyment is the same. Land-use regulations generally
have near analogues in private restrictions. The two are of the same
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"stuff" and, in the sense critical to our discussion, have the same effect on
the regulated owner's property rights.
We have seen an analogous situation in which private restrictive cove-
nants are the subject of an eminent domain transfer. This may occur, as
discussed previously, where A has the benefit of a restriction on B's land
and the government acquires B's land for use in a manner that breaches
the restriction. In that case an eminent domain transfer may occur. The
breach of the restriction diminishes A's property by loss of the right and
augments the government's property in B's land by being free of the bur-
den. Observe, however, that this is the opposite of what would occur if
the government imposed a police power restriction on A's land. A's loss,
instead of consisting of the release of a pre-existing benefit, would consist
of the receipt of a new burden. If that event were to result in a transfer to
the government, as eminent domain must entail, then government-to be
precise, some governmentally owned land-would have to be the recipient
of a new benefit from the restriction. Can that occur?
Regulatory land-use restrictions, like their analogous private restric-
tions, always cause transfers of real property rights, but not always to the
government. If there are 1,000 parcels of land within a given political ju-
risdiction and that jurisdiction imposes a zoning restricton on 100 of
them, the other 900 presumably receive a benefit. Though the effect is
much more diffuse than with private restrictions which are generally
among near neighbors, the same kind of transfer occurs in each situation.
The restricted owner or owners have their property rights diminished and
the benefitted owner or owners have their property rights correspondingly
and reciprocally augmented. At a high level of generality a transfer
occurs.
When then, can a land-use regulation cause a transfer to the regulat-
ing political entity? The answer is that this can occur only when that
political entity is the "other" landowner, i.e., when it owns, or at least has
some piece of ownership of, some land that is so situated that the regula-
tion benefits and augments it. It will not suffice merely that government
carries on some activity within the benefitted radius. The government
must hold real property interests and they must be of a kind capable of
receiving the "property" in the benefit. This is so because the transfer is
of a real property interest and only one who has an interest in land to
which that interest can attach can receive it.
Moreover, there must practically be some minimum threshold level of
benefit to the governmental realty before we can say there is a transfer.
For instance, it should not suffice if a city government, as the owner of
land here and there in a town, receives only an incidental or casual bene-
fit that is the same as that received by owners throughout the town. To
avoid absurd or, as old English judges would say, "inconvenient" results,
a transfer occurs to the government only when governmental land re-
ceives "special" benefits or perhaps "special and direct" benefits. One
should probably not say that governmental land must be the "intended"
beneficiary since that places on the landowner a proof burden that does
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not exist in other nontrespassory taking cases, to show motive or intent.
While the concept should be that governmental land is singled out as
probably the sole beneficiary, or at least one of a select group of benefi-
ciaries, the regulated owner should not have to prove this was subjectively
intended.
We may now state the test for a police power taking: A police power
regulation on land use is an eminent domain taking only when its effect is
specially directed toward benefitting a governmental entity in the use of
land in which that entity holds incidents of ownership. "Specially di-
rected" ordinarily signifies that the governmental land is singled out as
the sole beneficiary, or one of a select group of beneficiaries, but it does
not imply that governmental officials need have actual intent to produce
the benefit. Use of the phrase "holds incidents of ownership" instead of
the word "owner" allows for the possibility that there might be a benefit
to the government as holder of interests in land less than the fee, such as
an easement or a leasehold.
2. The Test Tested
Under the test or doctrine stated not many land-use regulations
amount to takings. Most building codes, fire codes, health regulations,
zoning restrictions, and environmental regulations, which together must
comprise the bulk of land-use regulations, would not. Their beneficial ef-
fects are ordinarily spread widely and faintly throughout the community
with some increased impact in and around the immediate area in which
they are in effect. It is not the intent of the test, for example, to make
governmental land an eminent domain transferee simply by its lying
within or adjacent to the boundaries of a zoning district. Rather, the in-
tent is to suggest that a regulation, to cause a taking, must have some
feature or features that single out governmental ownership for benefits
that do not accrue to the ownership interests of others. This eliminates
the test from operating on the vast majority of regulations. It is perhaps
easier to offer some examples of when the test would produce a taking
than when it would not.
The airport approach zoning cases provide the clearest and possibly
commonest example of a land-use regulation that may cause a taking.1 23
Hageman v. Board of Trustees, 2'4 a 1969 Ohio Appeals decision, provides
a vehicle for discussion. A local zoning board imposed restrictions consist-
ing mainly of limitations on height and building density on land that lay
within the approaches to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. This the court
of appeals held to constitute a taking of property of the owners of the
123 For citations to these decisions, see Chongris v. Corrigan, 409 U.S. 919 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1355, 1362-64 (1961). Surprisingly, decisions in
airport zoning cases appear to go as far back as 1939.
,14 20 Ohio App. 2d 12, 251 N.E.2d 507 (1969). But see Village of Willoughby Hills v.
Corrigan, 29 Ohio St. 2d 39, 278 N.E.2d 658, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 919 (1972) (though
distinguishing Hageman, seems to weaken it).
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land. The court saw an analogy in the aerial easement decisions such as
United States v. Causby,12 5 Griggs v. Allegheny County,126 and Acker-
man v. Port of Seattle.1 27 The court recognized that not only were the
landowners' property rights diminished but there was a corresponding
benefit to the governmentally owned airbase.128 The airport approach
zoning imposed what was in substance a land-use restriction, analogous to
a restriction created by covenant, with the landowners' lands as the bur-
dened parcels and the airbase as the benefitted parcel. A transfer oc-
curred in effect and the requirements of the test propounded above are
met.
Another possible extant example of a regulatory taking, depending on
the analysis used, may be the "reserved area" cases. Miller v. City of Bea-
ver Falls29 is perhaps best known. A city ordinance declared that a por-
tion of the plaintiffs land was to be within the area of a possible future
public park or playground. The ordinance did not outright forbid the
plaintiff from building on that portion but provided that if he did so
build and if the government did condemn that. portion for the projected
use within three years from the date of the ordinance his compensation
award would not include the value of the buildings. In holding the ordi-
nance to be a taking, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania seemed to rea-
son mainly that the city designed the ordinance to deny the owner just
compensation. Another line of analysis would be to say that the regula-
tion, a development freeze, was a means of keeping the land clear of im-
provements for the benefit of the possible future park owned by the city.
Certainly the ordinance would meet the test for a taking if the city re-
quired the owner to keep his land clear so that buildings would not, for
example, impede the passage of light and air to an existing city park next
door. The fact that the city did not, and might never, own the park land
introduces a complication that one may feel takes the case out of the test.
Still, the facts provide a possible example of the test in action.
One can imagine any number of fact patterns in which a land-use reg-
ulation could satisfy the taking test stated. Some possibilities include: a
stringent noise ordinance to benefit a nearby public hospital; special off-
street parking requirements to keep on-street parking available for
nearby public buildings; and single-family-dwellings-only zoning to pre-
vent competition with a public housing project. It is apparent that none
of these regulations are widespread. This is evidence that the test does
:25 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
26 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
127 55 Wash. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960).
12 It is interesting to note that a local government of the State of Ohio enacted the
zoning while the sovereign benefitted was the United States Government as owner of the
airbase. There is nothing unusual about this. States may, and indeed once did as a custom-
ary practice, condemn land for the federal government. See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S.
367 (1875) (upholds federal government's power to do its own condemnations and refers to
prior practice of states doing condemnations for United States).
19 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951).
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not allow compensation in many cases.
3. The Test Compared With Similar Tests
The test worked out here is of course far different from the "too far"
test of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon"0 or the variations built upon it.
However, the doctrine of Mugler v. Kansas"" and Professor Joseph Sax's
test, referred to earlier as "Sax I,"'' are both much more closely related
to the stated test, as well as to each other. The relationship to the theory
advocated here will be summarized briefly.
a. Mugler v. Kansas
Mugler v. Kansas, as we previously saw, stands for the proposition
that no police power regulation is an eminent domain taking. The regula-
tion may be void as lacking due process, but it cannot be objectionable as
a taking. The test propounded in this article appends a qualification to
Mugler's doctrine: a regulation, though usually not causing a taking, may
do so if "its effect is specially directed toward benefitting a governmental
entity in the use of land in which that entity holds incidents of
ownership."
In the day-to-day resolution of police power cases the test would not
frequently produce a different result from Mugler v. Kansas. As a pro-
position of law, however, the present test is significantly more accurate.
The theoretical, if not the practical, possibility of a regulation's serving to
enlarge governmental property rights at a private owner's expense encom-
passes a sizable spectrum. Also, the test gives full recognition to the ab-
stract nature of property rights and to their non-physical transfer which
Mugler, possibly because of its age, does not. The doctrine advanced ap-
plies constitutional eminent domain language and brings the subject of
police power takings into harmony with other trespassory and non-
trespassory takings in a way Mugler does not.
b. The test of Sax I
In Sax I Professor Sax advocated a test that is even closer to the one
stated here than is the doctrine of Mugler v. Kansas. His test was that
"when bconomic loss is incurred as a result of government enhancement
of its resource position in its enterprise capacity, then compensation is
constitutionally required .... But losses, however severe, incurred as a
consequence of government acting merely in its arbitral capacity are to be
viewed as a non-compensable exercise of the police power."138 Compari-
son of Professor Sax's test with the present one will show that, though
130 260 U.S. 393 (1922); see, text accompanying notes 27-31 supra.
:31 123 U.S. 623 (1887); see text accompanying notes 15-18 supra.
32 See text accompanying notes 81-86 supra.
133 Sax I, supra note 12, at 63.
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the two are rhetorically different and completely different in their theo-
retical derivations, they will produce the same result in most police power
taking cases that are apt to arise.
The Sax test, loosly rendered, is that "when a regulation only regu-
lates, there is no taking, but if it also has the effect of enriching a govern-
mental entity, it is a taking." The test presently proposed makes a taking
depend on whether the regulation benefits a governmental entity as a
holder of ownership interests in land. Professor Sax does not require that
enrichment be in the form of real property interests, but of any govern-
mental "resource position." This would include broadly any kind of per-
sonal or real property rights. In the present article, the test is cast in the
language of property law and attempts to deal only with the taking of real
property rights. Both tests imply a transfer from regulated landowner to
government, though neither states it explicitly. Thus, though the forms of
words are different, the two tests have similar meanings.
It is in their derivations and underlying theories that the two tests are.
entirely different. Professor Sax's doctrine comes from an understanding
of certain functions of government, essentially an exercise in political the-
ory. He finds that government may regulate in two basic capacities: as an
arbiter among citizens to settle or prevent conflicts and as an enhancer of
its own "resource position." In the latter capacity, government, he be-
lieves, is tempted, more than in the former capacity, to use eminent do-
main to oppress its citizens. The function of compensation is to provide a
disincentive to this form of oppression and is thus a political function.
His theory is not derived from or expressed through the concepts of prop-
erty law. By contrast, the theory presently advanced is basically a propri-
etary theory. Beginning with a constitutional eminent domain clause, it
attempts to express the meaning of the key words "property" and
"taken" within the concepts and linguistic forms of property law.'"
In their practical applications, the two tests ought to produce the
same result in any of the examples used in this article so far. One might
imagine a hypothetical case, however, in which different results appear.
Suppose a city operated a municipal bus line that ran by certain land and
the city council regulated that land in some way that "enhanced" the
city's "resource position" in its bus system and perhaps in the buses
themselves. Professor Sax's test would seemingly allow the landowner
compensation. The present article's test would not; so far as appears the
city has no real property interests to augment. Though the regulation di-
minishes the landowner's interests, government cannot be transferee of
any reciprocal real property interests unless it has some real property in-
terests capable of receiving them. To the extent similar cases might arise,
the present test and the Sax I test could produce different results; other-
'" The author's inability to accept some of Professor Sax's propositions long prevented
his sharing any of the conclusions of Sax I. Though the author still does not accept the
underpinnings of Sax I, he has not reached the same place but certainly the near vicinity by
a different road.
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wise they should not.
C. The Role of Due Process
One strenuous objection to the doctrine here advanced is that it works
drastically to the detriment of private landowners. That would not be so,
of course, when the alternative is the doctrine of Mugler v. Kansas which
would seemingly never allow the regulated landowner compensation. But
if a court applies the "too far" test of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon or
one of its variations, then the owner has much more opportunity to estab-
lish a taking than with the test here advanced. Apparently assuming that
Mahon's is the predominant doctrine now established in the courts, some
critics of the proposed test would label it "anti-landowner. '13 5 Conversely,
other critics who themselves apparently favor stringent environmental
controls seem to fear what would happen if courts denied owners compen-
sation that might now receive it. Their fear must be that fairly liberal
compenstion provides a "valve" that releases the owners' "steam" that
they would otherwise vent against the controls. 13
One answer, which likely will not satisfy critics, is that while legal
principles may in their application favor the interests of this or that class
of persons, they ought not be formulated for that purpose. Beyond this,
however, the test proposed will not have the, draconian result feared for
there is an "escape hatch." This is the constitutional guarantee of due
process which courts should give its full scope in controversies over land-
use regulations. Two recent important decisions from the highest courts
of the most populous states provide almost laboratory-like examples for
comparison. These decisions are Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of
New York1 3 7 and Agins v. City of Tiburon.138
In Fred F. French the New York Court of Appeals had before it a
zoning regulation that required the owner of the private Tudor Parks to
keep them as parks without buildings and to keep them open for public
use. Using the test of Sax I, the court held that the regulations did not
amount to a taking because they did not enrich the city in its "enterprise
capacity." The court, however went on to hold that the regulations unrea-
sonably deprived the owner of property rights in the land. On that basis
the zoning regulation was held void as a deprivaton of private property
without due process. In what is one of the most interesting aspects of the
decision, the court dealt with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon and with
its own prior decision in the leading case of Averne Bay Construction Co.
35See Hagman, Compensable Regulation: A Way of Dealing with Wipeouts From
Land Use Controls?, 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 45, 48-65 (1976).
136 The "fear" described in the test seems, in part at least, to motivate Professor Cos-
tonis in his article, "Fair" Compensation and the Accomodation Power: Antidotes for the
Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUm. L. R.v. 1021 (1975).
17 39 N.Y.2d 587, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 350 N.E.2d 381 (1976).
138 24 Cal. 3d 266, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 598 P.2d 25 (1979), affd - U.S. , 100 S. Ct. 2138
(1980).
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v. Thatcher.13 9 Arverne Bay held that zoning that deprived an owner of
all practical uses of his land was a taking because it went too far, esse-
tially an application of Mahon's doctrine. Fred F. French sidestepped
Mahon and Arverne Bay by saying that when they spoke of a "taking"
they were really using a "metaphor" for lack of due process.
Agins v. City of Tiburon is much like Fred F. French-up to a point.
A city's large-lot zoning allowed a landowner from one to five houses on a
five-acre tract, the exact number depending on a formula. In the posture
of the case as it came through the court of appeals, it appeared that the
zoning caused the owner to have a "lack of any remaining reasonably ben-
eficial use."' 4 0 Much as did the New York court in Fred F. French, the
court held there was no taking. The court, however, went on to hold there
was no denial of due process, leaving grave doubts in California whether
any regulation of land can ever be either a taking or a violation of due
process. Thus, the result in Agins does indeed produce a draconian result
and locks the "escape hatch" that Fred F. French leaves unlocked.
In evaluating the difference between Fred F. French and Agins it is
helpful to return to French's treatment of Mahon and Arverne Bay. A
theme that the author has developed in this article is that the "too far"
test for a taking largely duplicates part of Lawton v. Steele's classic test
for the substantive due process of a regulatory measure. Lawton's ques-
tion about whether a measure is unduly oppressive upon the persons reg-
ulated is hard to distinguish, particularly in application to the facts of an
actual case, from the question of "too far." If Agins fails to take proper
(and constitutionally required) account of Lawton v. Steele, Fred F.
French may have found the proper place for Mahon, as well as Lawton.
Fred F. French comes as close as any decision to showing the way out
of the dilemma over police power takings that has been the cause of so
much trouble since Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. Without requiring
the overruling of Mahon (which of course New York could not do any-
way), French finds a way to reconcile Mahon and Mugler v. Kansas, after
a fashion, without overruling either. French applies a test for a taking
that, on its facts, operates like the test developed here.241 With a little
.39 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
140 See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 80 Cal. App. 3d 225, 145 Cal. Rptr. 476, 481 (1978).
The California Supreme Court seemed to accept as a fact that the owner lost all beneficial
use. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 274, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 376, 598 P.2d 25,
29 (1979) (use of the phrase "[w]e now reach that issue"). The United States Supreme
Court's affirmance of Agins is no doubt important to land-use planners because it encour-
ages exclusionary zoning. For our purposes here, the development of theory, the Court's
reasoning is too superficial to make the opinion important. See Agins v. City of Tiberron, _
U.S. _, 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980).
1 Unfortunately the clear vision of Fred F. French has been clouded by a later deci-
sion in Spears v. Berle, 48 N.Y.2d 254, 397 N.E.2d 1304 (1979). New York's Freshwater
Wetlands Act authorized compensation when wetland regulations amounted to a taking.
The Court of Appeals used reasoning that ignored Fred F. French's analysis and read like a
reversion to Mahon's doctrine. Of course, the court was interpreting a statute that itself
embodied that doctrine, but the court, which cited Fred F. French, showed no recognition
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"touching up," French's test could bring the doctrine of police power tak-
ings into line with the constitutional concepts of "property" and "taking"
and with the principles applied in all other kinds of trespassory and non-
trespassory takings. Finally, Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New
York correctly identifies the interrelationship among the police power,
eminent domain, and due process. That other courts will follow New
York's lead is a thing earnestly to be wished.
that its theory was different from that of earlier decisions.
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